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Investing and Pretending
Anita K. Krug
ABSTRACT: One of the more prominent components of Dodd–Frank’s
regulatory changes was Title VII, providing for the regulation of the over-thecounter derivatives known as “swaps.” A swap is a financial instrument
whose value is based on an asset—the “reference asset”—that is wholly
unrelated to the swap itself. Although there was much ado about swap
regulation immediately after Dodd–Frank’s enactment, the same cannot be
said of the many rules that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) has subsequently adopted pursuant to its authority under Title
VII.
This Article critically evaluates the CFTC’s “swap rules” and identifies the
regulatory vision that they reflect. Based on that evaluation, it argues that
the swap rules are grounded in a notable distinction between swaps and
another financial market instrument—namely, securities. In particular,
whereas “investing” is the hallmark of securities transactions, swap
transactions fall under the rubric of “pretending,” a concept that this Article
employs to elucidate the function and structure of swaps. Each party to a swap
pretends that it holds either a long position or a short position in the reference
asset, making payments to (or receiving payments from) the other party based
on the performance of that position.
Although the distinction between investing and pretending is vividly reflected
in the CFTC’s approach to crafting the swap rules, this Article contends that
the distinction is irrelevant for regulatory purposes. Moreover, the substantial
regulatory costs arising from the CFTC’s pretense-based approach to swap
regulation are likely to excessively hinder swap use, as firms seeking to
mitigate risk turn to other types of hedging strategies in situations in which
using swaps might otherwise be more socially beneficial. With the goal of
efficient and coherent regulation in mind, this Article proposes that a
substantially better approach to the CFTC’s swap rules would be to predicate
them not on pretending, as the counterpoint to investing but, rather, on
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something that swap transactions and securities transactions have in
common—and on which securities regulation, too, is based: the risks arising
from speculation.
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INTRODUCTION

Although it may seem as though the financial crisis was only yesterday, it
began almost seven years ago, and Congress finalized the statute intended to
prevent its recurrence, the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 (“Dodd–Frank”),1 more
than four years ago. Since that time, those most affected by the financial crisis
have made substantial strides to rebuild and move on (though, to be sure, for
those most severely affected, progress has often been painfully slow). Of
course, a substantial subset of those emerging from the crisis—namely, those
comprising that vaguely defined group known as “Wall Street”—have also had
to face adjusting to the new regulatory world that Dodd–Frank created. Still,
commentary and debates about the new regulation and its proper focus and
tools have largely faded, as firms have accepted and settled into their new
obligations.

1. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15 U.S.C.).
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Or so it might seem. Despite the apparent return to calm and the
emergence of other events to draw our attention—new securities statutes such
as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act2 and controversial
Supreme Court decisions, such as those in the McCutcheon3 and Hobby Lobby4
cases—much remains unsettled and problematic regarding one of the most
critical components of Dodd–Frank. That component is Title VII of the
statute, which sets forth a comprehensive and entirely new regulatory regime
governing swaps.
“Swaps” are a type of derivative financial instrument, meaning that their
value is derived from the value (including the expected future value) of some
other financial instrument.5 They are just one of several types of instruments
falling within the derivative category. Others are options and warrants, the
value of which is derived from the value of particular securities, and futures
contracts, whose values are derived from the value of particular commodities
or securities.6 Swaps, moreover, are a derivative of the “over-the-counter,” or
“OTC,” variety, meaning that, at least traditionally, parties enter into them
privately, outside of any formal exchange mechanism.
Swaps were the anointed culprits behind much of the financial crisis’s
worst assaults on asset values. Recall AIG’s near-bankruptcy, the product of
the firm’s extensive transactions in a certain type of swap—namely, “credit
default” swaps.7 AIG, moreover, was not alone. Many financial institutions
served as willing counterparties for credit default swaps at the time, given the
robust demand for them—but then defaulted on them (or risked defaulting
on them) as the housing bubble burst, thereby feeding the systemic contagion
that produced the crisis. Still, the rationale for financial and commercial
firms’ extensive swap participation was clear: They sought to hedge risks, such
as the risk of default on mortgage-related or other liabilities,8 and viewed
using swaps as a cost-effective way to do that.9 Swap transactions, after all, were
not regulated.10 In 1999 Congress effectively forbade both the Securities and

2. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
4. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (defining “derivative”).
6. See infra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (describing different types of derivatives).
7. See infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text (describing AIG’s activities in the swap markets).
8. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani–
Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (“Corporate America considers risk
management vitally important and considers derivative financial products an indispensable tool
for managing many types of financial risk regularly faced by today’s corporations.”).
9. See Complaint at 49, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, No. 13-CV-1916 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2013) (noting that swaps have been a “cost-efficient[]”
hedging tool).
10. See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text (discussing swaps’ historically
unregulated status).
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the federal agency regulating commodity
futures, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), from taking
any steps to change that circumstance.11
This hands-off approach for swaps may have been, in part, a product of
the fact that financial-related policymaking focused on transactions involving
investing, particularly in securities, and not on those involving pretending.
That is, securities transactions, which are governed by extensive federal
regulation, fall under the rubric of “investing”—involving an investor’s
deriving value from an asset actually purchased—whereas swap transactions
may be more aptly characterized as exercises in “pretending.” Swaps involve
pretending because, unlike securities-related transactions, a swap does not
involve buying or selling anything––it is an agreement between private parties
to speculate on the value of some “reference asset.” Importantly, the reference
asset is wholly unrelated to the swap itself, a characteristic not typical of all
derivatives.12 Yet both parties pretend otherwise, agreeing that changes in the
value of the reference asset will determine what sums the parties owe to one
another under the swap.13
In stepped Dodd–Frank. Although not everyone embraced the particular
approach to regulating swaps that Congress ultimately chose,14 swap
regulation is arguably not among the statute’s most controversial changes.15
Dodd–Frank provides only part of the story of the new regulation, however,
in that the statute sets forth only a broad vision of how regulation going
forward will look. The other part of the story consists of the hundreds of rules
that the relevant regulatory agencies created, or are in the process of creating,
pursuant to their respective mandates under Dodd–Frank.16 Those rules
refine, elaborate, and implement Congress’s regulatory objectives by
specifying concrete requirements for the conduct of financial firms’
businesses.17
11. See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 106–12 and accompanying text (comparing swaps to other types of
derivatives).
13. See infra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
14. See Hester Pierce, Title VII: Derivatives, in DODD–FRANK: WHAT IT DOES AND WHY IT’S
FLAWED 77–88 (Hester Pierce & James Broughel eds., 2012), available at http://mercatus.org/
sites/default/files/publication/dodd-frank-FINAL.pdf (arguing, on multiple grounds, that Title
VII is problematic).
15. Dodd–Frank’s provisions prohibiting financial firms from engaging in certain
investment-related activities (implemented through the CFTC’s “Volcker Rule”) and creating the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau seemed to attract more controversy, as compared with
Title VII. See, e.g., The Dodd–Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.
economist.com/node/21547784 (reporting various criticisms of the statute).
16. See id. (noting that Dodd–Frank contains approximately “400 rule-making requirements”).
17. See Frank A. Mayer, III & Ahmad M. Hajj, Executive Order 13,563 and the United States
Supreme Court’s Decision in Mayo: Impact on Current and Upcoming Dodd–Frank Rulemakings, BANKING
& FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., June 2011, at 4 (observing that “various federal banking and securities
agencies are releasing a significant amount of rules to implement and interpret [Dodd–Frank]”).
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In the swaps context, the “relevant regulatory agencies” are the CFTC
and the SEC, which Dodd–Frank tasked with fleshing out the particulars of
the new regulation of swaps.18 The CFTC—which has regulatory responsibility
for all but a small percentage of swaps and therefore is the primary swap
regulator—began its rulemaking process shortly after Dodd–Frank’s
enactment, and that process remains underway, although it is in its final
stages.19 As a result, only recently did swap users and their advisors (among
others) apprehend that, taken together, the CFTC’s “swap rules” are
wrongheaded—a conclusion produced by the CFTC’s predicating the rules
on the accurate, but irrelevant, notion of swaps as instruments that necessitate
pretending.
To be sure, the swap rules’ regulatory basis is not express; rather, it is
evident in the rules’ formulation. And, to be sure, pretending—unregulated
pretending, at least—is problematic. Swaps’ basis in pretending means, for
example, that those who seek and provide credit protection through credit
default swaps largely have no connection to the “things” to which the swaps
refer.20 Consider the contrast: Because those who invest in securities actually
buy securities, and those who short securities actually borrow securities and
return securities to the lender, there necessarily is a limit to the amount of
investing that may be done at any given time. Pretense inflamed the financial
crisis because it has no such limits—everyone can pretend and, beyond that,
can pretend to own or have “exposure” to exactly the same debts, securities,
or other instruments as everyone else.21 Moreover, there is the possibility of
rampant pretenders—firms that have entered into countless swaps of the
same type or having the same reference asset. In short, the possible scope of
pretending in the credit default swap context multiplies the potential for
systemic contagion, arguably without a corresponding benefit to the
economy—or, indeed, to anything else.22

18. See infra notes 141–56 and accompanying text (listing some of Title VII’s rulemaking
mandates).
19. See Dodd–Frank Final Rules, Final Guidance, Final Exemptive Orders, and Other Final Actions,
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Dodd
FrankAct/Dodd-FrankFinalRules/index.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (noting that the agency
“began issuing proposed rules” under Dodd–Frank in August 2010 and remains “in the process
of implementing [Dodd–Frank]” as of the publishing of this Article).
20. See infra Part II.B (describing financial firms’ use of swaps in the financial-crisis era).
21. See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (discussing the limitless nature of swaps);
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
STATES 195 (2011) [hereinafter INQUIRY REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (observing that, in the financial crisis era, firms often entered
into credit default swaps not to insure assets they actually owned but, rather, to make “side bets
on the risks undertaken by others”).
22. See infra notes 73–93 and accompanying text (discussing swaps’ contributions to the
financial crisis).
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Nonetheless, pretending is not an appropriate basis of regulation. This
Article critically evaluates the swap rules to identify the regulatory vision that
they reflect. Through focusing on two important sets of rules—those defining
who is a “swap dealer” required to be regulated as such and those prescribing
Title VII’s extraterritorial application—it shows how the swap rules are
predicated on a notion of swaps as instruments based on pretending.23 It
argues that this (unacknowledged) foundation of the CFTC’s rulemaking is
inappropriate24 because the mode of regulation it produces imposes excessive
regulatory costs on those seeking efficient means to hedge their everyday
business risks—namely, commercial “end users,” the swap-market equivalents
of securities market investors.
This Article’s project additionally involves highlighting a critical
characteristic of pretending, namely, that it is fundamentally bilateral: Both
parties to a swap pretend.25 Thus, many of the swap rules, especially the more
troublesome ones, apply to both parties, if not in express terms then almost
certainly in effect, and do not aim to diminish information or power
imbalances in the parties’ relationship. In other words, the rules apply both
to financial market professionals who transact in swaps as a business and to
end users themselves.26 An equivalent approach in the securities context
would be for the SEC to apply its rules both to investors (those deemed to
need the protection of regulation) and to issuers and securities market
intermediaries (those against whom investors need protection).
Certainly, when the financial instrument to be regulated involves
(bilateral) pretending, rather than (unilateral) investing, there may be some
logic behind founding policymaking on that fact. That is, if there is no
“issuer,” as there is in the securities context, then, consistent with Congress’s
pre-Dodd–Frank approach, perhaps there is no reason to regulate the
instrument at all. Or, conversely, if there is no issuer, then, consistent with the
CFTC’s current approach, perhaps there is no reason not to apply regulation
to both the financial market professional and the end user. There is no need
to pursue that question further, however, because the key to understanding
the CFTC’s approach is the apparent circumstance that the agency does not
regard a swap as involving no issuer. Rather, it deems a swap to involve two
issuers27—a conception that readily produces the conclusion that it is as
necessary to regulate the market professional as it is to regulate the end user.

23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See infra notes 259–60 and accompanying text (discussing the bilateral nature of swaps).
26. See infra notes 195–99 & 262–63 and accompanying text (arguing that the swap rules
inappropriately apply to end users).
27. See Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 77 Fed.
Reg. 30,596, 30,607 (proposed May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter
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The problem with this framework, which the CFTC seems to ignore, is
that end users cannot be considered issuers to the same extent as swap dealers.
Furthermore, it is apparent from Dodd–Frank’s text that Congress perceived
that the burden of regulation should fall on swap dealers28—the AIGs of the
swap markets—presumably since their activities (and not those of end users
aiming to hedge commercial risk) were primarily responsible for the systemic
weaknesses that swaps created six years ago.29 The problem is more than
academic, moreover. Among other things, by adopting too broad a definition
of “swap dealer,” thereby subjecting end users to regulation that is equal in
many respects to the regulation to which swap dealers are subject, and by
further elevating pretending as a regulatory foundation in its “cross-border”
rules, the CFTC may have led firms that might turn to swaps as an efficient
hedging tool to rely on other (possibly less cost-effective) instruments for that
function.30 In short, the CFTC’s over-extension of regulation’s boundaries
arguably contradicts Congress’s determination that swaps serve a worthy
purpose in the financial markets and the goal that such a determination
implies: creating and protecting a market that is stable (from a systemic risk
standpoint), in which productive and value-enhancing swap transactions may
occur.
Of course, all of this leads to the question: what is a better basis for
regulation? The short answer is speculation. As noted above, the swap rules
reflect that swaps involve pretending, which places them in contrast to other
types of regulated financial instruments—particularly securities—which
involve investing. However, focusing on that distinction, if only implicitly, for
the purposes of swap regulation is misguided because of its assumption that
securities regulation is likewise based on it. It is not. At the heart of securities
regulation is the blunt circumstance that securities transactions are
predicated on speculation: investors’ placing assets in a security because they

Swap Dealer Release] (“Each counterparty to a swap in essence is the ‘issuer’ of that
instrument.”).
28. This is evident from the fact that a significant portion of the text of Title VII pertains or
applies to swap dealers, whereas those who simply use swaps are only sporadically mentioned. See,
e.g., Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721–754, 124 Stat. 1376, 1658–754 (2010)
(setting forth the regulation of swap markets other than security-based swap markets).
29. See infra notes 73–93 and accompanying text (describing AIG’s and other financial
institutions’ roles in the financial crisis).
30. Although there is not yet sufficient data on this point to draw conclusions, both
legislators and industry groups have speculated that the swap rules could reduce end users’
participation in the swap markets. See Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 93 (opining that the CFTC’s
cross-border rules “will create a preference for other products, such as futures”); cf. Letter from
Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, U.S. House Comm. on Fin. Servs., & Frank Lucas, Ranking
Member, U.S. House Comm. on Agric., to The Honorable Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Treasury, et al. (Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Bachus Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-39-10/s73910-5.pdf (contending that “[c]asting an overly-broad net in defining
[swap dealer] could force some smaller participants to leave the marketplace”).
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expect its value to increase or decrease, as the case may be.31 That activity,
taken to an extreme in any particular dimension (such as the amount
purchased, the type of security, or the frequency of transactions), creates risks
for market participants, market integrity, and systemic stability. This logic
informed Congress’s approach to swap regulation in Dodd–Frank.32 It should
also have informed the CFTC’s formulation of the swap rules—but,
unfortunately, it did not.
Part II lays the foundation for this Article’s arguments, describing what
swaps are and their purpose, the ways in which they contributed to the onset
and severity of the financial crisis, the challenges that formulating swap
regulation presents, and Dodd–Frank’s general approach to swap regulation.
With that background in place, Part III examines two sets of swap rules both
to demonstrate how the rules reflect a conception of swaps as based on
pretense and to highlight the problems that that circumstance spawns.
Among the most formidable difficulties is that the costs of the swap rules may
exceed their benefits, creating the conditions for inefficient swap markets and
hindering the achievement of regulatory objectives. Part IV turns to the
conclusions that we might draw from the particular brand of swap regulation
that the CFTC has pursued. It argues that the rules reflect the bilateral
regulatory approach that is entailed by the notion of swaps as pretense-based
instruments and describes a better mode of regulation––one that looks to the
securities regulatory model instead of eschewing it as inapposite. Specifically,
much as securities regulation is founded on the problems associated with the
speculation inherent in securities investing, so too must swap regulation be
centered on the speculation required of swap participants. The Article
concludes by suggesting that a reorientation of swap regulation is not only
desirable, but also feasible.
II. THE DERIVATIVES KNOWN AS SWAPS
Derivatives come in many shapes and forms. The label encompasses
options and warrants, instruments that are typically tied to securities.33 A call
option on a security, for example, entitles the holder to purchase a specified
amount of the security at a specified price and within a particular period of
time, while a put option entitles the holder to sell the security, subject to
similar parameters.34 Commodity futures contracts are also derivatives—

31. See infra notes 285–92 and accompanying text (discussing the role of speculation in the
securities markets).
32. See infra Part II.D (summarizing Dodd–Frank’s swap regulation).
33. See 6 Types of Equity Derivatives and Their Advantages, INVESTORGUIDE.COM (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.investorguide.com/article/11842/6-types-of-equity-derivatives-and-their-advantages-igu
(“There are several different types of equity derivative[s]; including options, warrants, futures,
forwards, convertible bonds, and swaps.”).
34. See Call Option, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/calloption.asp
(last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “call option” as “[a]n agreement that gives an investor the
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traded on formal exchanges—obligating one party to the contract to
purchase a specific amount of a commodity from the other party at a specific
date.35 In each case, the value of the instrument is determined based on—that
is, derived from—the value of the underlying security or commodity.36
Whereas options and warrants are subject to the same regulation as securities
under the securities laws,37 commodity futures contracts are regulated under
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”) and the associated CFTC
rules.38
And then there are swaps. Swaps are essentially contracts that require
each party to provide payments to the other upon the occurrence of events
specified in the contracts.39 Swaps have been called OTC derivatives, a label
signifying that they do not involve formal exchanges but, rather, are
agreements negotiated between private, sophisticated parties.40 Moreover,
swaps come in many forms––there are total return swaps, foreign exchange
swaps, interest rate swaps, and asset swaps—and serve varied purposes.41 Also
within the “swap” category are credit default swaps, which achieved notoriety

right (but not the obligation) to buy a stock, bond, commodity, or other instrument at a specified
price within a specific time period”); Put Option, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/p/putoption.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “put option” as “[a]n option
contract giving the owner the right, but not the obligation, to sell a specified amount of an
underlying security at a specified price within a specified time”).
35. See Commodity Futures Contract, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
commodityfuturescontract.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “commodity futures
contract” as “[a]n agreement to buy or sell a set amount of a commodity at a predetermined price
and date” and noting that “[b]uyers use these to avoid the risks associated with the price
fluctuations of the product or raw material, while sellers try to lock in a price for their products”).
36. See Derivative, FREE DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Derivative (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “[d]erivative” as “[a] financial contract whose
value is based on, or ‘derived’ from, a traditional security (such as a stock or bond), an asset (such
as a commodity), or a market index”).
37. This is evident from, among other things, the fact that the Securities Act includes
options and warrants in the definition of “security.” 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2013) (“The term
‘security’ means any . . . put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, . . . or any . . .
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”).
38. Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see Jerry W. Markham, Prohibited
Floor Trading Activities Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).
39. See Definition of Swap, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=swap (last visited
Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “swap” as “[a]n exchange of streams of payments between two parties”).
40. See Michael McCaffrey, An Introduction to Swaps, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.
com/articles/optioninvestor/07/swaps.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (noting that “[u]nlike most
standardized options and futures contracts, swaps are not exchange-traded instruments” and that
“[i]nstead, swaps are customized contracts that are traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market
between private parties”).
41. See An In-Depth Look at the Swap Market, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/trading/11/introduction-swap-market.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (describing
different types of swaps).
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during and after the financial crisis for having been a primary cause of it.42
This Part sets forth the background necessary for Part III’s discussion of the
CFTC’s swap rules. Subpart A explains how swaps work, while Subpart B
summarizes their role in the financial crisis. Subpart C describes how the
nature of swaps creates regulatory challenges, and Subpart D outlines Dodd–
Frank’s approach to swap regulation.
A. SWAPS
“Swaps” are agreements to exchange (to “swap”) money. For any given
swap, how much money will be exchanged and at what times depends on the
reference asset. For example, a typical total return swap has as its reference
asset a particular amount of a particular security—100 shares of Google, for
example. One party to the swap holds the “long” side of the swap, effectively
betting that the reference asset will increase in value or is otherwise a sound
asset, while the other party holds the “short” side, effectively betting that the
reference asset will decline in value or that there will be a default as to it. Every
swap, then, comprises a long leg and a short leg—its yin and yang, two sides
of a single coin. This section describes how swaps work and the role they play
in the financial markets.
1. Their Nature
Swaps allow parties to speculate on the value of some reference asset. For
illustration purposes, let us assume that Party A and Party B enter into a swap
that has as its reference asset the 100 shares of Google noted above. Party A
has the long leg, and Party B has the short leg. If, over the term of the swap,
Google stock increases in value, Party B will be obligated to pay the amount
of that increase per share (times 100) to Party A. And if Google declares and
pays any dividends to its shareholders, Party B will be obligated to pay the
amount of each dividend per share (times 100) to Party A. As a result of those
payments, over the term of the swap Party A will have the experience of
owning 100 Google shares without actually owning them. The benefit to Party
A should be evident: If the market price of Google stock were, say, $50 per
share at the time the parties execute the swap, then, by using the swap to gain
exposure to Google, Party A is able to retain in its bank account—or deploy
for other purposes—the $5000 that it would otherwise have used to buy those
100 shares. Because of the swap, it is as though Party A borrowed $5000,
rather than use its own funds, for the purpose of investing in Google.
Of course, Party A did not actually borrow anything to achieve the effect
of owning—that is, having a long position in—Google stock. But the fact that
the swap creates that effect is incorporated into the swap’s terms. Just as Party

42. See René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15384, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15384.pdf
(describing the ways in which credit-default swaps exacerbated the financial crisis).
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B is responsible for paying to Party A amounts that Party A would receive if it
actually owned 100 shares of Google, Party A must pay to Party B amounts
equal to the interest that Party A would pay if it had actually borrowed $5000,
based on an agreed-upon interest rate.
Moreover, recall that Party B holds the short leg of the swap and is the
side wagering, in our example, that Google’s prospects are dismal. As a result,
Party A is also obligated to pay to Party B any amounts by which a share of
Google declines in value over the swap’s term (times 100). Accordingly, just
as the swap gives Party A the experience of buying and holding Google stock,
it creates for Party B the experience of having sold 100 shares of Google
short.43
As its name implies, then, a total return swap gives Party A the total
“upside” to owning the reference securities, while it gives Party B the total
downside to owning those securities, as well as the amounts a lender would
earn as interest if it had loaned to Party A the amount necessary to actually
buy the securities.44 That amount is the “notional” amount—the label
attached to the value of the reference asset.45 But again, in entering into a
swap, neither Party A nor Party B buys, sells, or borrows anything from
anyone.46 The parties merely enter into an agreement to give each other the
experience of having borrowed funds and purchased securities, on the one
hand, and having loaned funds and “shorted” securities, on the other.47 In

43. In a short sale, a trader borrows stock from a broker or other securities lender and sells
it in the open market, with the hopes that the market price for the stock will thereafter decrease.
See Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of American and British Hedge Fund
Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 358 (2008) (describing the process of selling securities
short). Later on, the trader will purchase in the open market the same amount of the same
security that she borrowed and will return those shares to the broker, in satisfaction of her debt.
See id. If all went well and the expected depreciation occurred, the trader will have earned as a
profit the drop in price—the difference per share between the price at which she sold the shares
that she borrowed and the price at which she later purchased replacement shares. See id.
44. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 279 (2011)
(explaining that “[t]otal-return swaps are contracts in which parties agree to exchange sums
equivalent to the income streams produced by specified assets” and that they “involve an exchange
of the income stream from: (1) a specified number of shares in a designated company’s stock, and
(2) a specified interest rate on a specified principal amount”); Janet Tavakoli, Introduction to Total
Return Swaps, TAVAKOLI STRUCTURED FIN., INC., http://www.tavakolistructuredfinance.com/trs/
(last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (generally describing the payment arrangements associated with total
return swaps).
45. See Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as Collateral, 57
BUS. LAW. 1127, 1130 n.11 (2002) (“The notional amount of a derivative transaction is a theoretical
amount that is used to calculate the payment or delivery obligations under the transaction.”).
46. See CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 279 (noting that total return swaps “do not transfer title to
the underlying assets or require that either party actually own them”); Michael J. de la Merced, A
Legal Solution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2008), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9F06E5D9103CF931A2575AC0A96E9C8B63 (observing that total return swaps merely “give
investors what they call ‘economic exposure’ to . . . companies”).
47. As the CSX court observed,
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short, the parties to a swap effectively agree to pretend that they have done
those things.
Of course, there are many types of swaps, referencing different assets and
requiring different types of payment streams based on those assets.48 Interest
rate swaps, for example, obligate each party to pay the other party “interest”
on a designated principal amount over the term of the swap, with one party’s
payments typically based on a fixed rate of interest and the other’s based on
a floating rate.49 A party might take the long leg of the floating rate (and,
therefore, the short leg of the fixed rate)—receiving the floating-rate
payments and paying the fixed-rate amounts—if she believes that the floating
rate may increase over the term of the swap.50 The other party will necessarily
have the opposite legs for each rate, profiting if the fixed rate is higher than
the floating rate. Regardless of the specific terms, however, the swap provides
the interest-related effect, for each party, of having both loaned and borrowed
the principal amount. Yet neither party borrowed or loaned anything; they
merely are pretending to have done so.
Credit default swaps differ substantially from the model of swap in which
each party makes occasional payments to the other, such as payments
representing interest on a hypothetical notional amount or the change in
value of a security or other asset. Like other types of swaps, however, credit
default swaps involve pretending. With a credit default swap, one of the
parties—the short party—pretends that it has exposure to a debt or other
liability.51 Under the swap, the short party must make periodic payments to
the long party, and, if there is a default as to the reference asset—the
liability—the long party must make a payout to the short party to cover the

[T]he long party periodically pays the short party a sum calculated by applying an
agreed-upon interest rate to an agreed-upon notional amount of principal, as if the
long party had borrowed that amount of money from the short party. Meanwhile,
the short party periodically pays the long party a sum equivalent to the return to a
shareholder in a specified company—the increased value of the shares, if any, plus
income from the shares—as if the long party owned actual shares in that company.
CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 279.
48. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (listing types of swaps).
49. See Definition of Interest Rate Swap, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=interestrate-swap (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (“An interest rate swap is a contract to exchange fixed
payments for floating payments linked to an interest rate, and is generally used to manage
exposure to fluctuations in interest rates.”); Interest Rate Swap, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/i/interestrateswap.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “interest rate swap”
as “[a]n agreement between two parties . . . where one stream of future interest payments is
exchanged for another based on a specified principal amount,” which typically provides for the
“exchange [of] a fixed payment for a floating payment that is linked to an interest rate”).
50. See Definition of Interest Rate Swap, supra note 49 (describing uses for interest rate swaps).
51. See Credit Default Swap—CDS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
creditdefaultswap.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “credit default swap” as “[a] swap
designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income products between parties”).
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imaginary loss associated with the default on the liability.52 Accordingly, we
might say that the long party pretends that it is an insurer, willing to assume
the risk of a possible default based on an optimistic view of the repayment
prospects as to the reference liability.53 Similarly, the short party pretends that
it is an insured, hoping for a compensatory payout based on a pessimistic view
regarding those same prospects.
The swaps in the examples above involve the pretense associated with any
swap, regardless of whether the parties use them for hedging purposes or
otherwise. The pretense is that, within the four corners of the swap contract,
each of the parties borrowed a certain amount of funds from the other,
bought a certain amount of stock, or sold a certain amount of stock short. To
be sure, it is important not to overstate the point. Swaps are only one of many
financial market transactions that allow participants to gain exposure to
profit- (or loss-) producing assets. Even so, pretending is unique to swaps.
2. Their Purpose
Swap participants commonly enter into swaps because the participants
actually have exposure to the reference asset (apart from the “synthetic”
exposure created by the swap itself).54 Thus, a swap may provide a means of
hedging that exposure—that is, of transferring to another party the risk
associated with it.55 For example, if Party B in the example of the total return
swap above actually owns 100 shares of Google, then taking the short leg of a
total return swap that has the same amount and number of Google shares as
its reference asset permits Party B to reduce the risk arising from owning
Google stock. That is, if Google stock appreciates, then Party B benefits
through its actual stock holdings; if Google stock depreciates, then Party B
benefits through its swap because, now, Party A bears the risk of that
depreciation.
Similarly, using an interest rate swap as an example, if a firm has
borrowed $100,000 from a bank at a fixed rate of interest, the firm might wish
to reduce or eliminate the risk that a floating rate will become more favorable
(that is, lower) over the term of the loan by entering into a swap with the same

52. See Credit Default Swap Definition, THESTREET, http://www.thestreet.com/topic/47402/
credit-default-swap.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (noting that “the seller of the [credit default]
swap will pay the buyer in the case of a credit event (default) by a third-party” and that “[i]f no
default occurs, the seller of the swap will have collected a premium from the buyer”).
53. Cf. Credit Default Swap—CDS, supra note 51 (“The buyer of a credit default swap receives
credit protection, whereas the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the debt
security.”).
54. See, e.g., Janis Sarra, Equity Derivatives and the Challenge for Berle’s Conception of Corporate
Accountability, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1117, 1128 (2013) (observing that parent companies use
swaps “to hedge risks associated with . . . companies in which they are directly invested”).
55. See Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An Analysis of Swap Risks and a Critical
Assessment of the Basle Accord’s Treatment of Swaps, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 259, 295 (1995)
(“[S]waps . . . are often used to hedge risks of other assets on the balance sheet.”).
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term that refers to a notional amount of $100,000. The firm would take the
long side of the fixed-rate payments and the short side of the floating-rate
payments—meaning that it would receive the former (equal to the interest
payments it must make on its actual loan) from the other party and pay the
latter to that other party. The swap would constitute protection against falling
floating rates because it would effectively transform, from fixed to floating,
the rate applicable to the net interest payments the firm must make,
considering both the loan and the swap. And the firm would have transferred
to the other party the risk that floating rates will be lower than fixed rates.
Credit default swaps may also be used as hedging tools. For example, if a
bank has loaned $10 million to the local widget factory, it may enter into a
credit default swap with another party to eliminate the default risk associated
with the loan. The swap would refer to a notional amount of $10 million and
specify that the bank will make periodic payments—equivalent to premiums
in the insurance context—to the other party over the term of the swap. The
other party, who now bears the default risk, would be obligated to make a onetime payment to the bank if one of any number of specified “default events”
occurs. Those triggering events could be, for example, the downgrading of
the factory’s credit rating, its bankruptcy, or, of course, its actual default on
the loan.56
The usefulness of swaps is not limited to transferring risk. Parties may also
use swaps for purposes of pure profit generation.57 For example, if a hedge
fund believes that Twitter stock will appreciate in value but does not want to
deploy the capital to buy Twitter stock, the fund could enter into a total return
swap, taking the long leg. If the fund has not taken a short position vis-à-vis
Twitter in another transaction, then its swap does not serve a risk-mitigation
function. Similarly, if the fund believes that General Motors (“GM”) will
default on the bonds it recently issued to the public, then it can enter into a
credit default swap that uses GM bonds as the reference liability, taking the
short leg—even if it has no long exposure to GM bonds elsewhere. If the fund
is correct in its assessments of the profitability of such a transaction, the
resulting profits are indeed pure profit because they are not offset by losses
from another transaction in which the fund assumed the opposite stance. But
it works both ways. If the fund is incorrect and has no offsetting position, it
will sustain pure losses.
56. Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized
Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 52 (2011)
(“Credit events triggering payment on CDSs typically include default and bankruptcy by the
reference entity, but CDSs may also protect against debt restructuring or credit rating
downgrade.”).
57. See, e.g., Alexandros Seretakis, Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons from the
American Experience, 8 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 438, 464 n.163 (2014) (“Equity derivatives
such as total return swaps allow an activist [investor] to increase its economic exposure to the
target [company] and gain additional profits from a share price appreciation without increasing
its voting rights.”).

A5_KRUG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

INVESTING AND PRETENDING

4/13/2015 3:01 PM

1573

B. SWAPS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The ways in which swaps—credit default swaps, in particular—fueled the
financial crisis have been amply chronicled elsewhere.58 Painted with broad
brush strokes, the picture begins with an asset price bubble in the national
housing market.59 The bubble was, in part, a product of the ways in which
institutions involved in mortgage lending, either as originators or purchasers
of mortgages, transferred the default risk associated with the mortgages.60
Since the early 1970s, loan originators had been able to shed themselves of
mortgage-default risk by selling the loans to third parties—primarily the
government agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,61 but also, in the years
leading up to the crisis, myriad other financial institutions.62 At one point or
another in those years, those other financial institutions joined Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac in employing a financial tool designed to further spread and
defuse default risk: securitization.63
In the securitization process, financial institutions bundled together
many mortgages and contributed them to investment entities (funds) in
which investors purchased ownership interests. These ownership interests, by
another name, were mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”)—debt securities
backed by mortgages.64 To address the concern that few investors wished to
buy interests in the lower-rated “tranches” of mortgage bundles held by any
particular fund, the sponsoring institutions pooled the lower-rated tranches
of many such funds.65 Because the pool of low-rated tranches, by definition,
had greater diversification than the group of lower-rated tranches within any
particular fund, the securities they issued—known as “collateralized debt
obligations” (“CDOs”)—were, remarkably, usually rated triple-A.66

58. See, e.g., INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 233–379 (detailing the role of credit default
swaps in the financial crisis); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND
THEMSELVES 159–60, 397–98 (2009) (describing the consequences of AIG’s extensive
participation in credit default swaps).
59. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 157–59 (describing the emergence and growth of
the housing bubble).
60. See id. at 125 (describing the “pipeline through which risky mortgages were conveyed
and sold throughout the financial system”).
61. See id. at 38–42 (describing the functions of the Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”)).
62. See id. at 102 (“In 2004, commercial banks, thrifts, and investment banks caught up with
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in securitizing home loans.”).
63. See id.
64. See id. at 42–45 (describing the pre-financial crisis growth of residential-mortgage
securitization and the risk-transfer effects of securitization).
65. See id. at 127 (describing the process of repackaging the lower-rated tranches of many
mortgage-backed funds into CDOs).
66. See id. (observing that CDOs were “mostly rated triple-A,” even though the reason for
that rating “was not obvious”).
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A mortgage pool’s investors, then, ultimately bore the risk that the loans
comprising the pool’s portfolio would default—a risk that the investors were
willing to bear in return for sharing in the interest payments that borrowers
would pay on the mortgages.67 After all, since the pools now owned the
mortgages, the pools were entitled to receive borrowers’ principal and
interest payments on them.68 In effect, securitizing mortgages not only
transferred the default risk associated with them but also scattered it among
many “lenders” (the pools’ investors). Once neither mortgage originators nor
mortgage purchasers had to bear any default risk, mortgage lending standards
became increasingly lax and mortgages flowed freely.69 Because almost
anyone could obtain a mortgage—regardless of their personal assets or credit
history and, in many cases, without making a down payment—housing
demand grew.70 Predictably, so did housing prices.71 Thus emerged the
housing price bubble—and, as increasing numbers of homebuyers defaulted
as interest rates on adjustable-rate mortgages ratcheted up, thus burst the
bubble.72 And the financial crisis was underway.
The very existence of the housing price bubble meant that there had
been substantial leverage—debt—in the economy.73 Where there is debt, of
course, there are lenders—those who bear the risk of default, whether they
originated the particular loans at issue, bought them from someone else, or
invested in a mortgage pool. And where there are lenders, there is risk—and
attempts to mitigate it. Credit default swaps provide one way to do that.74 By
entering into a swap contract, a lender or pool investor can tailor protection
to cover the risk of default on a particular debt, at the cost of a periodic
payment tantamount to a premium.75

67. See Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Essay, Systemic Risk and Market Institutions, 26
YALE J. ON REG. 445, 445 (2009) (“With private-label MBS, [as opposed to those sponsored by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or other government-sponsored entities,] investors bore default risk.”).
68. See Robert G. Gucwa, The 2007 Collapse in Securitization: A Case for Regulatory Reform, 14 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 249 (2011) (observing that, in transactions in asset-backed securities, the
investors “receive[] the right to all future principal and interest payments on those loans”).
69. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 109–11 (chronicling the collapse in mortgagelending standards).
70. See Winston Sale, Effect of the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on Affordable
Housing, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 287, 295 (2009) (“Low interest rates
and relaxed mortgage lending standards made homeownership possible for populations
previously unable to qualify for mortgages, further increasing the demand for housing.”).
71. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 156 (“Nationally, housing prices jumped 152%
between 1997 and their peak in 2006, more than in any decade since at least 1920.” (footnote
omitted)).
72. See id. at 213–30 (detailing the bursting of the housing bubble).
73. See id. at 134 (“The mortgage pipeline . . . introduced leverage at every step.”).
74. See id. at xxiv (“[Credit default swaps] were sold to investors to protect against the default
or decline in value of mortgage-related securities backed by risky loans.”).
75. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text (describing the structure of credit default
swaps).
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Yet, in the months leading to the financial crisis, lenders seeking to hedge
their exposure to mortgage-related and other liabilities were only one set of
participants in the credit default swap market. The other group comprised
those who may have had no exposure to a particular debt—that is, they were
not the originators or purchasers of the debt—but who had a view as to the
risk of default as to it. If, for example, a financial firm believed that certain
MBS or CDOs were good credit risks, they could enter into credit default
swaps (on the long side) that referenced those securities.76 Or, if an investor’s
financial advisor held a similar belief, the investor could participate in socalled synthetic CDOs—complex instruments not involving tranches of
mortgage-backed securities but involving, instead, credit default swaps
referencing those securities.77
When housing prices began to collapse in 2007, and debtors throughout
the economy defaulted, there arose the prospect that it would soon be time
for those on the long side of many credit default swaps to pay out.78 They were
unable to uphold their obligations, however. The insurer AIG provides the
most sobering example on this point. That company had “insured,” through
credit default swaps, debt—mostly CDOs—with an aggregate notional value
of almost half a trillion dollars.79 It is not difficult to imagine that a payout of
that magnitude was not possible, particularly because AIG had not hedged its
possible obligations under its credit default swaps, such as by entering into
offsetting credit default swaps as to which it held the short side.80 That
circumstance naturally raised the question of why the firm had put itself in
such a precarious position.81 One answer is that it believed that the heady days
of the housing bubble would never end or, at least, would not end any time

76. The final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission describes this phenomenon:
“The purchasers of credit default swaps . . . profited spectacularly from the housing crisis, [but]
they never made a single subprime loan or bought an actual mortgage. In other words, they were
not purchasing insurance against anything they owned. Instead, they merely made side bets on
the risks undertaken by others.” See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 195.
77. See id. at 142 (explaining synthetic CDOs).
78. See id. at 265–74 (discussing AIG’s increasingly dire circumstances in 2008 as a
dominant long party for credit default swaps).
79. See Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory Initiatives: A New
World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 183–84 (2009) (noting that AIG’s
credit default swaps “opened AIG to billions of dollars of potential losses and payouts, upon a
credit event occurrence”).
80. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 266 (explaining that AIG did not “hedge its
exposure” on its credit default swaps, “in part because of the mistaken belief that” payments to
counterparties would be necessary “only if holders of the super-senior tranches” of the reference
assets (largely CDOs) suffered losses).
81. See Robert Lenzner, Why Wasn’t AIG Hedged?, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2008, 1:25 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/2008/09/28/croesus-aig-credit-biz-cx_rl_0928croesus.html (describing circumstances
that may have led AIG to take on the exposure that it did).
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in the foreseeable future.82 Based on such a belief, AIG could assume that it
would never be called upon to pay and that, instead, it would simply be on the
receiving end, accepting payments from its counterparties.
AIG was not alone in having extensive long exposure through credit
default swaps. It was in the company of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley, as well as scores of hedge
funds.83 Although many of these institutions, unlike AIG, did attempt to
hedge their exposure on either the long side or the short side by entering into
offsetting swaps,84 that effort was only marginally successful, as the
insolvencies of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers exemplify.85 Hedging was
not an answer for obvious reasons––if AIG or another long-side party could
not make good on its payment obligations under its swaps, that would impede
their short-side counterparties’ ability to make good on their own long-side
obligations.86 If Merrill Lynch, for example, had hedged its own long
exposure primarily by taking the short side of AIG’s long-side swaps, the
prospect that Merrill Lynch would be able to satisfy its long-side obligations
would have diminished.87 This state of affairs was exacerbated by the fact that
both the value of collateral that firms had posted with lenders and the
reference assets for many of their derivative agreements were (increasingly
worthless) housing-related assets, such as mortgage-backed securities.88 That
circumstance, in turn, was further exacerbated by the fact that the challenged
firms’ credit ratings were simultaneously sinking—a separate consequence of

82. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 26–67 (stating that the actuarial model on which
AIG relied “had determined with 99.85% confidence that the owners of the super-senior tranches
of the CDOs insured by AIG . . . would never suffer real economic losses”).
83. See Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd–Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and
Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 527–29 (2011)
(describing various financial firms’ difficulties in 2007–08 and the ensuing government bailout).
84. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 234 (observing that “[i]n late 2006 and early 2007,
some banks moved to reduce their subprime exposures by . . . buying protection through credit
default swaps”).
85. See Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying Broker-Dealer Law to
Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 804 (2009) (“In 2008 Bear Stearns collapsed and was
acquired by JPMorgan Chase . . . [and] Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.”).
86. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 299–300 (“If a party is unable to make . . .
payments [under its credit default swaps] when they become due, that failure may cause
significant financial harm to its counterparty, which may have offsetting obligations to third
parties and depend on prompt payment.”).
87. The prospect that the difficulties experienced by one derivatives dealer would infect the
activities of others was likely, given the small, interconnected character of the world of derivatives
dealing. See Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to
Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 21, 2003), in BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2003) [hereinafter Buffett Letter], available at http://www.berkshire
hathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf (“Large amounts of risk . . . have become concentrated in the
hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one another.”).
88. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 234 (describing how financial institutions “had
been busy for nearly four years creating and selling subprime-backed [CDOs]”).
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their exposure to housing-related assets.89 The devastating result of these
events was that counterparties and lenders demanded ever-greater amounts
of collateral as protection against default risk,90 further draining the troubled
firms’ already-limited liquid assets.91
That is the systemic contagion that the financial crisis wrought. At the
same time that triggering events for swap payouts were pervasive, so were
parties’ failures to meet their payment obligations. Moreover, any potential
rescuers, such as institutions that could lend additional capital to or purchase
an equity stake in the struggling firms, understandably kept their distance.
Indeed, lending activity virtually stopped altogether, in a mammoth retraction
of the credit markets that affected all parts of the economy, whether on Wall
Street or on Main Street.92 There was no telling, after all, the extent to which
would-be borrowers held stakes in investments and other instruments—socalled “toxic” assets93—that reflected a positive view of the housing market.
C. CHALLENGE TO REGULATION
In light of the risk-transferring role of credit default swaps, it is not
surprising that these swaps are deemed to have been a primary contributor to
the length and severity of the financial crisis. Also not surprisingly, what to
“do” with credit default swaps, from a regulatory perspective, was at the
forefront of policymakers’ concerns following the crisis.94 And, post-crisis,
regulate policymakers did, as Subpart D details. Dodd–Frank required parties
to buy and sell swaps using clearinghouses and mandated that those who deal

89. See id. at 273; cf. id. at 243 (noting the concern of AIG executives that AIG’s credit
default swaps required AIG to post collateral to its counterparties if either “the market value of
the referenced securities decline[d] by a certain amount” or if “rating agencies downgrade AIG’s
long-term debt”).
90. See id. at 234 (observing that, over the course of 2007, “repo lenders became less and
less willing to accept subprime and Alt-A mortgages or mortgage-backed securities as collateral”).
91. See id. at 293–96 (describing how lenders who provided funding to troubled financial
institutions through repurchase agreements (repos) imposed ever greater “haircuts” on the value
of the collateral they held); Buffett Letter, supra note 87, at 14 (observing how counterparties’
demands for collateral worsen the problems of firms experiencing financial difficulties).
92. See Jeff Sommer, Seeking Solace? You’ll Find Little in the Bond Market, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 22,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23safe.html (“Much of the turmoil in
the financial sector and the overall economy has emanated from the credit markets.”); Andrew
Ross Sorkin et al., As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02crisis.html (observing that, in September 2008,
“the credit markets had almost completely frozen up,” and “[b]anks were refusing to lend to
other banks”).
93. See Max Holmes, Op-Ed., Good Bank, Bad Bank; Good Plan, Better Plan, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan.
31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/opinion/01holmes.html (explaining that
assets are “toxic” to the extent they are “illiquid, volatile and at depressed prices”).
94. See Christian Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, and Dodd–Frank: The
Implications of US Global OTC Derivative Regulation, 14 NEV. L.J. 542, 555–59 (2014) (describing
the post-financial crisis push to regulate swaps and other OTC derivatives).
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in swaps be registered as such with either the SEC or the CFTC.95 Before
turning to that discussion, however, it is worth considering the challenges of
regulating swaps—challenges that stem from the circumstance that perhaps
no other financial instrument is, at once, both exceedingly appropriate and
exceedingly inappropriate for regulation.
Of course, one might logically question how regulating swaps can be
inappropriate, particularly considering the extensive and complete
regulation of securities that has existed since the 1930s96 and the similarly
extensive regulation of commodity futures, which originated during the same
era.97 After all, both securities and commodity futures are, like swaps, financial
instruments.98 Although policymakers, commentators, and scholars regularly
question the particular forms that securities regulation, for example, has
assumed,99 few question the need for it.
Swaps are different from securities, however, in that they are not
investments. Investments are assets that investors buy based on the prospect
that the assets will generate income or increase in value over time.100
Accordingly, both equity securities and debt securities are investments. Of
course, so is artwork and real estate. However, from a regulatory perspective,
securities are special as among investments because they are intangible.101
They cannot be inspected, as a house can be; they cannot be weighed, as gold
can be. Securities investors, therefore, have a particular need for truthful
information about them and the entities that issue and sell them, and

95. See infra notes 135–55 and accompanying text (describing Dodd–Frank’s regulation of
swaps and swap participants).
96. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Financial Armageddon Routs Law Again, 14 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2013) (“The backbone of securities regulation was created in the 1930s as a
reaction to the crash that led to the Great Depression.”).
97. See Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly—Reform Is Needed, 48 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 977, 982 (1991) (observing that commodity futures regulation came about in 1936).
98. The breadth of the term “financial instrument” is evident from its definition. See, e.g.,
Financial Instrument, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/
financial-instrument.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “financial instrument” as “[a]
document (such as a check, draft, bond, share, bill of exchange, futures or options contract) that
has a monetary value or represents a legally enforceable (binding) agreement between two or
more parties regarding a right to payment of money”).
99. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Investing; Wall St. Reform Falls Short, Survey Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/31/business/investing-wall-st-reform-fallsshort-survey-says.html (reporting that professional money managers were skeptical of Congress’s
post-Enron changes to the securities laws).
100. See Investment, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investment.asp
(last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “investment” as “[a]n asset or item that is purchased with
the hope that it will generate income or appreciate in the future”).
101. See Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities
Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (1993) (noting that “securities are intangible
merchandise, the sale of which is peculiarly subject to abuse”).
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ensuring the provision of that information is the securities laws’ signal
objective.102
Strictly speaking, an investor’s short positions—in which the investor
borrows a security that it then sells, with the hopes that the security will decline
in value—are not “investments” as to that investor.103 However, every short
sale necessarily involves a purchaser on the opposite side of the transaction.104
Hence, short sales, like any sale of securities, fall within the ambit of securities
regulation.105 The same is true of options and warrants on securities.106 To be
sure, options and warrants are derivatives,107 in the sense that the value and
existence of an option or a warrant is derived from the security on which it is
based.108 Nonetheless, an investor’s exercise of an option or warrant entails
either an investment in the underlying security or disposing of such an
investment.109 Options and warrants, in other words, are unexercised rights
to buy or sell securities—transactions that are the core subject matter of
securities regulation.
Swaps, by contrast, involve neither purchasing an asset (or the right to
purchase an asset) nor selling one. Rather, they are simply contracts between

102. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating Industry,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 103 n.108 (2014) (“It is axiomatic that the predominant regulatory
philosophy in securities regulation is disclosure of information.”).
103. For a description of the process of selling a security short, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
104. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
105. For example, the SEC’s Regulation SHO provides that, before accepting an order to
effect a short sale, a broker–dealer must either have borrowed the security on behalf of the short
seller or have reasonable grounds to believe that it can borrow the security. 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.203(b)(1) (2014). In addition, the SEC’s Regulation M prohibits the purchase of securities
in a secondary or follow-on offering if the purchaser has sold the stock short within a certain
period prior to the time the offering price is set. See id. § 242.105(a).
106. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that options and warrants are generally
regulated under the securities laws).
107. See John W. Hill et al., Increasing Complexity and Partisanship in Business Damages Expert
Testimony: The Need for a Modified Trial Regime in Quantification of Damages, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 297,
349 (2009) (“Common equity can be of various classes and can have various forms of derivative
securities attached, such as stock options and warrants.”).
108. Note, Private Causes of Action for Option Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5: A Policy, Doctrinal,
and Economic Analysis, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1977 (1987) (“[T]he values of option contracts
are determined in large part by the price of the underlying security and its volatility.”); cf.
Stéphane Rousseau, The Future of Capital Formation for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Rethinking
Initial Public Offering Regulation After the Restructuring of Canadian Stock Exchanges, 34 REVUE
JURIDQUE THÉMIS (n.s.) 661, 704 (2000) (Can.) (“If the securities are overpriced in the IPO,
their price will go down after the offering and the warrants will become less valuable.”).
109. Cf. Regulation D Offerings and Private Placements (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Mar. 15–17,
2012), WL ST029 ALI-ABA 569 (discussing the position of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance
that, “upon a cashless exercise of options or warrants, the newly acquired underlying securities are
deemed to have been acquired when the corresponding options or warrants were acquired”).
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sophisticated parties.110 As with any contract, a derivative contract contains
mutual promises, is subject to interpretation based on common law contract
doctrine, and is legally enforceable.111 If, in other contexts, a party’s
negotiation of and entering into a contract is not generally something that is
subject to regulation, then it is not immediately apparent why negotiating and
entering into a swap should be treated any differently. In short, a swap is
simply a private matter between private parties and does not implicate assets
or transactions beyond the contract’s perimeter.112
Nevertheless, from an alternative perspective—the perspective of one
who recalls the financial crisis’s economic devastation, say—regulation of
swaps seems appropriate and, indeed, long overdue.113 Yet if swaps are merely
tailored, enforceable contracts between knowledgeable parties, how can it be
that they are suitable regulatory subjects? The simple answer is that there is
no limit to the amount of pretending that the world can do. The following
excerpt from the final report of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
is illuminating:
[Credit default swaps] were essential to the creation of synthetic
CDOs. These synthetic CDOs were merely bets on the performance
of real mortgage-related securities. They amplified the losses from
the collapse of the housing bubble by allowing multiple bets on the
same securities and helped spread them throughout the financial

110. See Kevin A. Reiss, Securities, in Developments in Banking Law: 2000, 20 ANN. REV. BANKING
L. 106, 108 (2001) (noting that “swaps are contracts negotiated between private parties”). That
parties to swaps are “sophisticated” is product of that fact that, both prior to and after Dodd–Frank,
swap participants have had to satisfy certain financial criteria. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(e) (2013))
(prohibiting persons “other than . . . eligible contract participant[s]” from entering into nonexchange-traded swaps); see also Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106554-App. E, § 103, 114 Stat. 2763A-365, 2763A-377 (exempting from regulation swap participants
who qualified as “eligible contract participants” and met certain other requirements); 17 C.F.R.
§ 35.2(a) (2010) (exempting from regulation swap participants who qualified as “eligible swap
participants”).
111. See Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Wins Judge’s Nod for Contract Settlement, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 11, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/judgeapproves-pact-to-end-detroit-swap-deal/(“The United States Bankruptcy Code contains a ‘safe
harbor’ for financial derivatives that says, in effect, that swaps and other such financial contracts
remain fully enforceable, even in bankruptcy.”).
112. This conclusion does not change based on the consideration that commodity futures—
which, like securities, are heavily regulated—are formally also contracts. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text (describing commodity futures contracts). There are a number of important
differences between commodity futures contracts and swaps, including that, unlike swaps,
anyone—sophisticated or not—may enter into a futures contract, with the result that, for any
particular contract, there may be substantial power imbalances between the parties. See GLOBAL
DERIVATIVES STUDY GRP., GRP. OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 32 (1993)
(explaining that “futures contracts [are] accessible to members of the general public, including
retail speculators”).
113. For a discussion of the role that swaps played during the financial crisis, see supra Part II.B.
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system. Goldman Sachs alone packaged and sold $73 billion in
synthetic CDOs from July 1, 2004, to May 31, 2007. Synthetic CDOs
created by Goldman referenced more than 3,400 mortgage
securities, and 610 of them were referenced at least twice. This is
apart from how many times these securities may have been
referenced in synthetic CDOs created by other firms.114
Swaps, recall, are based on pretense—the pretense that a party to the contract
has invested in a security, holds a short position as to the security, has
borrowed or loaned a sum of money, or is a creditor potentially at risk of not
being repaid.115 By contrast, investments are limited. At any given time, a
public company may issue only so many shares of stock and has only so many
shares outstanding (which, in turn, also sets a limit on the exercise of options
or warrants as to those shares).116
Everyone, in theory, can pretend—many times over and in any
magnitude. Accordingly, an adverse event as to the subjects of that pretending
(the reference assets), such as defaults on mortgages that serve as the
reference assets for credit default swaps or the bankruptcy of a large company
whose stock is the reference asset for total return swaps, may have systemic
consequences. That is particularly the case to the extent that the same
contracting parties have disproportionately “pretended,” either by entering
into many such contracts or by entering into contracts referring to assets with
sizable notional values. Insofar as swaps present limitless exposure
opportunities without corresponding safeguards, the rationale for regulation
is clear.
D. TITLE VII OF DODD–FRANK
Dodd–Frank was Congress’s response to the financial crisis—its attempt
to bolster the integrity and soundness of the financial markets and thereby
forestall future crises.117 Given the legislation’s purpose, it is hardly surprising
that it is far-reaching, touching virtually all components of the financial and
capital markets. Its many sections pertain to corporate governance,118 credit114. INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 21, at xxiv–xxv.
115. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the ways in which transacting in swaps involves
pretending).
116. A corporation, for example, cannot issue a greater number of shares than the amount
authorized in its articles of incorporation. See, e.g., Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 701, 733 (2011) (observing that a firm’s authorized capital, as set forth in its
articles of incorporation, is the “upper limit on how many shares management can issue without
the shareholders’ approval”).
117. The statute states its purpose in its preamble: “[T]o promote the financial stability of
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15 U.S.C.).
118. See, e.g., id. §§ 971–972 (“Strengthening Corporate Governance”).
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rating services,119 banking and brokerage practices,120 investment advisers and
hedge funds,121 proprietary investing by financial institutions,122 consumer
protection,123 mortgage lending,124 and more. Dodd–Frank also regulates
swaps and the swap markets.125
Prior to Dodd–Frank, swaps were not regulated—and that was not a
matter of happenstance or oversight. Rather, it was an express product of
congressional and regulatory action, embodied, most recently, in the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (the “CFMA”).126 That
statute, which divided the regulatory terrain concerning financial instruments
between the SEC and the CFTC,127 prohibited either agency from regulating
OTC derivatives, including swaps.128 More specifically, it exempted from the
coverage of the CEA—the statute that regulates commodity futures—
individually-negotiated swaps referencing financial assets or non-agricultural
commodities, such as energy and metals, entered into by parties qualifying as
“eligible contract participants.”129 In so doing, the CFMA excluded those
swaps from CFTC’s regulatory authority.130 Moreover, although the 2000
legislation placed oversight authority for security-based swaps with the SEC, it
severely curtailed the reach of that authority.131
119. See, e.g., id. §§ 931–939 (“Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies”).
120. See, e.g., id. §§ 161–176 (“Additional Board of Governors Authority for Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies and Bank Holding Companies”); id. tit. VI (“Improvements to Regulation of
Bank and Savings Association Holding Companies and Depository Institutions”).
121. See, e.g., id. tit. IV (“Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others”).
122. See, e.g., id. § 619 (“Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds”).
123. See, e.g., id. tit. X (“Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection”).
124. See, e.g., id. tit. XIV (“Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act”).
125. See, e.g., id. tit. VII (“Wall Street Transparency and Accountability”).
126. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15 U.S.C.).
127. See id. § 251(a)(2)(D)(i) (giving the SEC “jurisdiction and authority over” securitiesrelated instruments).
128. See id. §§ 103, 107 (excluding OTC derivative transactions from the CEA’s coverage).
129. Id. § 103.
130. The CFMA also affirmed and preserved the CEA’s pre-emption of state anti-gambling
and “bucket shop” laws that states otherwise may have enforced against these exempt instruments.
See id. § 210 (specifying that the CEA preempts certain state laws).
131. See, e.g., id. § 202(a)(g)(1)(4) (exempting boards of trades registered with the CFTC
from certain SEC rules in connection with their listing of security futures contracts). In
mandating a hands-off regulatory policy toward swaps, the CFMA merely affirmed lawmakers’
long-existing sentiment against swap regulation. Almost ten years prior to the CFMA’s enactment,
as swaps became ever more prevalent in the financial markets, Congress sought to ensure that
courts could not declare swaps to be “illegal, off-exchange futures contract[s].” MARK JICKLING,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: REGULATION OF ENERGY DERIVATIVES 3
(2006), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21401_20060421.pdf. Specifically, in
1992, Congress enacted the Futures Trading Practices Act, which permitted the CFTC to
expressly remove most types of swap transactions from the CEA’s purview. See Futures Trading
Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590 (repealed 2000). The CFTC
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That swaps were largely free of regulation meant that, when Congress
faced its task of implementing a regulatory framework for swaps after the
financial crisis, it was able to paint on a canvas that was relatively blank—but
not completely. Both before and after Congress passed the CFMA, swaps were
indirectly subject to regulatory oversight as a result of the fact that banking
and brokerage institutions were primary swap counterparties.132 Both types of
institutions are subject to extensive regulation—by the SEC and the Federal
Reserve, respectively—which encompasses, for example, complying with net
capital requirements based on their particular activities, including those
pertaining to swaps.133 Still, the pre-Dodd–Frank swap regulation was
necessarily limited in scope and depth, as it was merely a by-product of
regulatory regimes directed primarily at core areas unrelated to swaps.134
Post-Dodd–Frank, swap regulation is decidedly not limited in scope.
Before delving into the content of the new regulation, it is worth noting that
the term “swaps,” for purposes of Title VII of Dodd–Frank and the agency
rulemaking that implements it, does not encompass those swaps that are
associated with the SEC’s traditional regulatory realm: securities. Dodd–Frank
refers to those swaps as “security-based swaps,” which it further defines to
encompass, for example, total return swaps that reference a single security or
a narrowly based index of securities and credit default swaps referencing a
single credit or a narrowly based index of securities.135 The statute places
security-based swaps within the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction and places all

used that authority to exempt from regulation swaps and other OTC derivatives, on the basis that
such instruments are individually negotiated by sophisticated parties, rather than standardized
and accessible to the general public. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Policy
Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 30,694–96 (July 21, 1989).
132. See Net Capital Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,487 (May 10, 1993) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240) (“Broker-dealers registered with the [SEC], or . . . affiliates of the broker-dealer,
along with certain banks, principally serve as financial intermediaries in the OTC derivative
products market, undertaking a dealer or market-making function.”); Roberta Romano, A
Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 59 (1996) (“The
major players in swaps are commercial banks, whose activities are heavily regulated by federal
banking agencies.”).
133. See Romano, supra note 132, at 59 (“Banking regulators use three principal tools of
control: examinations, reporting requirements, and capital requirements.”).
134. See Desmond Eppel, Note, Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 40 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 680 (2002) (noting that “[b]anking regulators indirectly regulate the swaps
market”).
135. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1755–56 (2010)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68) (2012)) (defining “security-based swap”).
Accordingly, within the CFTC’s purview are such instruments as swaps referencing commodities,
weather, energy, and emissions, as well as interest-rate and foreign-exchange swaps and a variety
of other swaps that do not seem to fit comfortably within the aegis of either agency. See id.
§ 721(a)(21) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)) (defining “swap”). There are also
creatures labeled “mixed swaps,” which have characteristics of both swaps and security-based
swaps. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(D)) (defining “mixed swap”).
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other swaps (those not qualifying as security-based swaps) under the CFTC’s
jurisdiction.136
In light of this demarcation between swaps relating to securities, on the
one hand, and all other swaps, on the other, Title VII is essentially bifurcated,
with some provisions applicable to swaps and those who transact in them and
other provisions applicable to security-based swaps and those transacting in
them. Just as Dodd–Frank sets forth regulatory obligations for firms meeting
the definition of swap dealer,137 then, it also sets out separate (but largely
identical) obligations for firms falling within the definition of security-based
swap dealer.138 Nevertheless, security-based swaps comprise only a small
portion of all swaps.139 In addition, the CFTC has been considerably more
active than the SEC in proposing and finalizing rules under Title VII.140
Accordingly, this Article focuses only on Title VII’s provisions that relate to
swaps (rather than security-based swaps) and the CFTC’s rules pertaining to
them.
Although Title VII’s many provisions cover almost as many discrete
topics, the new regulatory world for swaps consists of four primary
components. The first is a requirement that swap participants meeting the
definition of “swap dealer” or “major swap participant” register with the CFTC
as such and comply with the particular (and extensive) requirements that
apply to swap dealers or major swap participants, as the case may be.141 As Part
III explains in more detail, swap dealers are, in essence, persons who hold
themselves out as parties willing to enter into swaps as principal—that is, on
their own behalf (“for [their] own account”), rather than in an agency
capacity, acting merely as middlemen.142 Not encompassed by the term “swap

136. See id. § 712(b)(1)–(2) (confirming that the CFTC has no jurisdiction over securitybased swaps and security-based swap dealers and that the SEC has no jurisdiction over swaps and
swap dealers).
137. See id. §§ 721–754 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.) (pertaining
to regulation of the swap markets).
138. See id. §§ 761–774 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (pertaining
to regulation of the securities-based swap markets).
139. See Roberta Rampton, CFTC’s O’Malia Opens Door to More Swaps Trade Debate, REUTERS
(Mar. 15, 2011, 8:00 AM) (“The Dodd–Frank law gave the CFTC jurisdiction over most of the
over-the-counter swaps market, although the [SEC] has oversight of a small slice related to
securities-based swaps.”).
140. See Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, The New Regulation of Swaps: A Lost
Opportunity, 55 COMP. ECON. STUD. 535, 546 (2013) (noting that, from the time Dodd–Frank was
enacted to April 2011, the SEC proposed and adopted 12 rules under Title VII, while the CFTC
proposed and adopted 49).
141. See Dodd–Frank Act § 731 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (requiring registration and
regulation of firms falling within the definition of “swap dealer” or “major swap participant”). For
a listing of some of the substantive obligations to which swap dealers, as well as major swap
participants, are subject, see infra notes 309–16 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text (discussing Dodd–Frank’s definition of
“swap dealer”).
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dealer,” as Title VII very generally defines it, is anyone who, though entering
into swaps for its own account, nonetheless does not do so “as part of a regular
business.”143 For its part, Title VII defines “major swap participant” to
encompass persons whose transactions in swaps are substantial but who
cannot be considered swap dealers.144 Although the statute broadly defines
what types of persons qualify as swap dealers or major swap participants, it
leaves to the CFTC the work of defining the terms used in those definitions.145
As Part III shows, the agencies’ efforts on this front have substantively shaped
the scope of the new regulation of the swap industry.
A second important component of Dodd–Frank’s swap regulation is the
requirement that most swaps be submitted to a registered “derivatives clearing
organization” (“DCO”).146 In essence, as a result of that provision, parties
must execute swaps through so-called clearinghouses, which stand between
the parties, effectively acting as the counterparty to each.147 As for which swaps
must be cleared, that determination is left to the CFTC, which must review
swaps or categories of swaps that a DCO claims it is prepared to clear.148 In its
review, the CFTC must consider a number of specific factors, including the
effect that clearing the swap might have on systemic risk mitigation and
whether the DCO has the resources and capacity to clear the swap.149
Third, in connection with the clearing requirement, Dodd–Frank
instructs the CFTC to adopt rules requiring a DCO to report to the CFTC any
143. Dodd–Frank Act § 721(a)(21) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49)) (defining
“swap dealer”).
144. Id. § 721(a)(16) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(33)) (defining “major swap
participant”).
145. See id. § 721(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8321) (authorizing the CFTC to
adopt rules further defining the terms “swap,” “swap dealer,” and “major swap participant”).
Similarly, Dodd–Frank authorizes the SEC to adopt rules further defining the terms “securitybased swap,” “security-based swap dealer,” and “major security-based swap participant.” See id.
§ 761(a)(6) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)).
146. See id. § 723(a)(2) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)) (providing that, unless
an exemption applies, it is unlawful to enter into a swap unless the swap is submitted to a DCO).
147. Each counterparty periodically deposits with the clearinghouse sufficient funds to cover
amounts that it would owe to its counterparty if the swap were settled at that time. See Sean J.
Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61
EMORY L.J. 1153, 1155–56 (2012) (explaining the purpose of the clearing requirement).
Although Congress imposed the clearing requirement so that “the consequences of [a
counterparty’s] default will . . . not spread throughout the broader financial system,” id. at 1156,
some observers have questioned its efficacy. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2013) (“[C]learinghouses can only marginally lower systemic risk.”);
Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 393
(2013) (arguing that the “distorted incentives” of those who use clearinghouses “can . . . lead to
behavior that increases the chances that the clearinghouse itself descends into crisis”).
148. See Dodd–Frank Act § 723(a)(2) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(A)(i))
(requiring the CFTC, on an ongoing basis, to review swaps or categories of swaps that DCOs list
for clearing).
149. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)) (setting forth the factors the
CFTC must consider in conducting its review).
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swap that it clears as soon as practicable after executing the transaction150 and
to make the reported information publicly available.151 Swaps that are not
subject to mandatory clearing must likewise be reported to the CFTC
(predictably, without the assistance of a DCO) or to a registered “swap data
repository,”152 although that reporting is not subject to a public disclosure
requirement. If one of the parties to an uncleared swap is a swap dealer or
major swap participant, that party has the reporting obligation, with the
former having the obligation if one party is a swap dealer and the other is a
major swap participant.153
The fourth and final core component of Dodd–Frank’s swaps regulation
is formulated as a prohibition and, at first glance, does not seem particularly
important or interesting. Specifically, consistent with principles of
international comity, section 722(d) cautions that neither the statute nor any
rule that an agency might adopt pursuant to authority granted by the statute
will apply to activities outside the United States, unless those activities “have a
direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of
the United States.”154 This provision—only one sentence long—is tucked away
amidst some of Title VII’s more attention-grabbing and substantive
provisions. As Part III contends, however, as a result of the CFTC’s
interpretation of the provision, it has become perhaps the most complex and
controversial component of the new swap regulatory regime—as well as the
most problematic.155

150. See id. §§ 725(e), 727 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a-1(k), -2(a)(13)) (requiring
DCOs to report to the CFTC swaps that they clear in accordance with the rules adopted by the
CFTC governing public swap data reporting).
151. See id. § 725(6) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)) (requiring public disclosure
of cleared transactions).
152. See id. § 729 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6r(a)) (requiring the reporting of
uncleared swaps).
153. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6r(a)(3)) (specifying which parties have
reporting obligations relating to uncleared swaps). If neither party is a swap dealer or a major
swap participant, the parties must agree between themselves which one will report the
transaction. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6r(a)(3)(C)).
154. See id. § 722(d) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(i)) (setting forth extraterritorial
limitations of Dodd–Frank’s swap-related provisions).
155. See infra Part III.B. Title VII contains many additional provisions (beyond those
discussed in this section). Among them, for example, are provisions prohibiting large (as
determined by the CFTC) trades in swaps that the CFTC determines to serve “a significant price
discovery function with respect to” public companies, Dodd–Frank Act § 730 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6t(a)(1)), and requiring firms that execute swap transactions—that is,
who act as an intermediary between a swap counterparty and a DCO—to be registered with the
CFTC as either a “swap execution facility” or as a DCO and to comply with various reporting,
recordkeeping, and monitoring requirements, see id. § 733 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7b3) (setting forth the regulation of swap execution facilities).
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III. THE SWAP RULES
Dodd–Frank’s swap regulation, comprehensive though it may be, is also
skeletal. Many of the requirements take the form of directions to the CFTC to
adopt rules to elaborate on and implement various broadly articulated
subjects.156 Thus, although Title VII has been the subject of extensive
commentary and analysis, it does not—indeed, cannot—on its own illuminate
life in the new regulatory world, for it left to the CFTC the task of constructing
much of that world. Following Congress’s instructions, the CFTC has devoted
substantial energy in the years since Dodd–Frank’s completion to implement
Title VII’s provisions through its rulemaking process.157 Yet, unlike Title VII
itself, these new rules have garnered very little attention in the press—apart
from that associated with sporadic accolades to the CFTC for (apparently) its
sheer prolificacy—and virtually no attention in the academy.158 As a result,
there has been very little focus on how the rules undercut Congress’s postfinancial crisis regulatory objectives.
This Part evaluates two significant groups of the CFTC’s swap rules,
showing that, although the agency’s task was to refine and elaborate Title VII,
the rules nonetheless set in place a regulatory regime that is arguably at odds
with Congress’s vision for swap regulation. Subpart A focuses on the rules
determining whether a person is a swap dealer and, therefore, subject to
regulation as such, while Subpart B evaluates the rules governing Title VII’s
extraterritorial application and their implications for well-functioning and
efficient swap markets. The analyses show how these rules reflect the CFTC’s
own regulatory vision—one that, grounded in the pretending that all swaps
involve, ignores the greater importance of the similarities between investing
and pretending.

156. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(E))
(mandating rules governing a DCO’s submission, for CFTC review, a swap that it seeks to accept
for clearing); id. § 726(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8323(b)) (mandating rules
designed to mitigate conflicts of interest of DCOs, swap execution facilities, and others); id. § 727
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13)(C)) (mandating rules governing the public
availability of swap transaction and pricing data); id. § 731 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 6s(d)) (mandating rules governing swap dealers and major swap participants).
157. So far, the CFTC has produced dozens of rules and thousands of pages describing the
rationale behind them. See Jeff Mason & Alina Selyukh, Update 2-Obama Nominates Senate Aide for
FCC Republican Commissioner, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2013, 2:31 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
2013/08/02/obama-cftc-fcc-idUKL1N0G22PK20130802 (reporting that the CFTC “has been
writing scores of new rules to change the structure of the opaque [swap] market”).
158. For example, Joe Nocera of the New York Times lauded then-CFTC chairman Gary
Gensler’s performance based, in part, on Mr. Gensler’s having overseen the CFTC’s adoption of
“dozens of rules to regulate derivatives” pursuant to Dodd–Frank’s requirements. Joe Nocera,
Op-Ed., The Little Agency That Could, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
11/16/opinion/the-little-agency-that-could.html. Although Mr. Nocera claimed that the rules
both made the swap markets more transparent and “lower[ed] prices,” he did not describe any
of the rules or how they accomplish the feats he identifies. See id.
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A. THE SWAP DEALER RULES
As Part II discusses, Dodd–Frank creates a new category of regulated
persons—swap dealers—based on those persons’ activities dealing in swaps.159
In particular, Dodd–Frank defines the term “swap dealer” to mean one that
“holds itself out as a dealer in swaps,” is a market-maker in swaps, “regularly
enters into swaps . . . as an ordinary course of business for its own account,”
or pursues activities that cause it to be known in the trade as a swap dealer or
market-maker.160 The statute also expressly excludes as a swap dealer one who
enters into swaps for its own account “but not as a part of a regular course of
business.”161 However, the statute left many blanks in the swap dealer
definition, directing the CFTC, jointly with the SEC,162 to fill them in.163 As
this Subpart shows, the agencies filled in the blanks, in a set of rules and
interpretations, in such a way as to extend swap dealer regulation beyond the
boundaries that Congress likely intended—and beyond the realm of sensible
regulation.
In defining what a swap dealer is, the agencies promulgated both
(1) rules excluding certain swaps from consideration in determining whether
a person falls within the definition;164 and (2) interpretive guidance outlining
what types of activities might cause one to fall within any of the four prongs
of the swap dealer definition, noted above (collectively, the “swap dealer

159. Although Dodd–Frank and the swap rules generally subject swap dealers and major swap
participants to the same requirements, see Dodd–Frank Act § 731 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 6s) (setting forth requirements to which swap dealers and major swap participants will
be subject), this Article focuses only on the former. As noted in Part II, the “major swap
participant” category is intended to capture swap participants that are not swap dealers but that
nonetheless engage in significant swap-market activity. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
The swap rules’ application to major swap participants raises similar concerns to those raised in
the swap dealer context, which this Subpart describes. However, in light of the CFTC’s further
elaboration of Dodd–Frank’s definition of “major swap participant,” informed observers believe
that very few swap participants will be required to be regulated as such, with the CFTC estimating
that approximately six participants in the United States will be captured by the definition at any
given time. See Matt Cameron & Joe Rennison, Zombie Firms Are First Dodd–Frank Major Swap
Participants, RISK MAG. (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2252713/
zombie-firms-are-first-doddfrank-major-swap-participants (“The [CFTC] estimated last year that
up to six derivatives users would fall into the MSP category.”).
160. Dodd–Frank Act § 721(a) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49)) (defining “swap
dealer”).
161. Id.
162. Although the rules pertaining to the meaning of “swap dealer” are formally the joint
product of the CFTC and the SEC, it is apparent—and not surprising, given Dodd–Frank’s
bifurcated approach to swap regulation, see supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text—that
the CFTC was the dominant force in formulating the rules.
163. See Dodd–Frank Act § 712(d)(1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8302) (providing
that the CFTC and the SEC “shall further define the terms ‘swap’, ‘security-based swap’, ‘swap
dealer’”).
164. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg)(5)–(6) (2014).

A5_KRUG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

INVESTING AND PRETENDING

4/13/2015 3:01 PM

1589

rules”).165 Perhaps the most important of the exclusions is a de minimis
provision, as mandated by Dodd–Frank,166 providing that, if the aggregate
notional value of a person’s swap transactions over the previous 12 months
did not exceed a threshold amount, the person need not register as a swap
dealer, even if the person otherwise falls within the definition.167 The
remaining exclusions provide that swaps that a firm might enter into with its
majority-owned affiliates,168 swaps entered into by a cooperative with a
member of the cooperative,169 swaps that an individual enters into as a trader
on the floor of an exchange,170 and, as discussed below, swaps that a firm uses
to hedge physical positions that it actually holds171 need not be taken into
account for purposes of determining swap dealer status. The guidance, for its
part, lists various identifying characteristics of swap dealers, including that
they make themselves available to enter into swaps, enter into swaps on their
own standard terms, can create new kinds of swaps, often have regular
clientele, and seek new clients pursuing swap activities.172
Taken together, the exclusions and the guidance are ill-suited to capture
those who should arguably be regulated as swap dealers, while excluding
those who should not. The difficulties are first evident in the agencies’ frontand-center discussion of how the “dealer–trader” distinction—a longstanding
tool in the securities context to separate those who fall within the Exchange
Act’s definition of “dealer” from those who are merely traders or hedgers173—
is also “an appropriate framework for interpreting the statutory definition of
the term ‘swap dealer.’”174 In this discussion, the agencies point to various
activities that, in their view, not only indicate dealing activity for purposes of
the Exchange Act but also suggest that a person is “acting as a swap dealer.”175
Among these activities are providing liquidity by being available to do so;
advising counterparties regarding the use of swaps to meet the counterparties’
165. See Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,596–616 (May 23, 2012) (setting forth
the CFTC and SEC’s final rules and interpretive guidance relating to the definition of swap dealer).
166. See Dodd–Frank Act § 721(a)(49)(D) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49)(D))
(“The [CFTC] shall exempt from designation as a swap dealer an entity that engages in a de minimis
quantity of swap dealing in connection with transactions with or on behalf of its customers.”).
167. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg)(4).
168. See id. § 1.3(ggg)(6)(i).
169. See id. § 1.3(ggg)(6)(ii).
170. See id. § 1.3(ggg)(6)(iv).
171. See id. § 1.3(ggg)(6)(iii); see also infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
172. See Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,606–16 (May 23, 2012) (setting forth
the agencies’ interpretive guidance).
173. See Definition of Terms in and Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings Associations, and
Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 Fed.
Reg. 8686, 8688 (Feb. 24, 2003) (“The dealer/trader distinction recognizes that dealers normally
have a regular clientele, hold themselves out as buying or selling securities at a regular place of
business, have a regular turnover of inventory . . . and generally provide liquidity services.”).
174. Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,607.
175. Id.
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hedging needs; having “regular clientele”; acting as a market maker in swaps;
and “helping to set the prices offered in the swap market.”176
To the extent that one might take comfort from the clarity of this
distinction, however, that comfort is short-lived. Despite embracing the
dealer–trader distinction, the agencies caution that the activities indicating
dealer status, “though instructive, may be inapplicable to swaps in certain
circumstances or may be applied differently in the context of dealing activities
involving commodity, interest rate, or other types of swaps.”177 From there,
the agencies proceed to list a number of differences between the securities
and the swap contexts and explain how those differences affect the
application of the dealer–trader distinction to swap market activity. For
example, the predominance of non-standardized instruments in the swap
markets “suggest[s] that concepts of what it means to make a market need to
be construed flexibly in the contexts of the swap markets,” and the fact that
“[s]wap markets are marked by less activity than [securities markets] . . .
suggests that in the swap context, concepts of ‘regularity’ should account for
a participant’s level of activity in the market relative to the total size of the
market.”178 Indeed, according to the agencies, determining whether a person
is a swap dealer will depend on all relevant facts and circumstances.179
Ultimately, then, the agencies’ extensive curtailment of the dealer–trader
distinction in the swap context defeats the purpose of the analogy. Despite
the familiarity of the distinction among market participants and despite the
agencies’ emphasis on its usefulness, it arguably does nothing to clarify who
is and who is not a swap dealer.
Beyond providing general guidance concerning what activities are
“dealing activities,” the agencies address certain prongs of the swap dealer
definition.180 For example, recall that, under Dodd–Frank’s definition of swap
dealer, a person is a swap dealer if it holds itself out as a dealer in swaps or
engages in activities that cause itself to be known in the trade as a dealer or
market maker in swaps.181 In seeking to assure end users that their sporadic
activities of seeking out swap counterparties and developing new types of
swaps (a role that dealers typically perform) will not, without more, cause
176. Id.
177. Id. at 30,606. As CFTC Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia observed in his dissent to the
swap dealer rules, “for all of its girth, the CFTC [Swap Dealer Release] fails to answer a basic
question—namely, under which circumstances would an entity be deemed a dealer (rather than
a trader or hedger) with respect to specific swap transactions?” Id. at 30,761 (dissenting statement
of Comm’r Scott D. O’Malia).
178. Id. at 30,607.
179. See id. at 30,608 (“[W]hether a person is acting as a dealer will turn upon the relevant
facts and circumstances.”).
180. See id. at 30,608–10 (providing guidance as to the “holding oneself out as a dealer” and
the “market maker” prongs of the swap dealer definition).
181. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text (setting forth the definition of swap
dealer under Dodd–Frank).
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them to be considered swap dealers, the agencies provide only watered-down
relief. “[T]hese end users do not necessarily fall within the definition of a swap
dealer,” they opine—for the determination will depend on “applicable facts
and circumstances.”182 Similar uncertainties emerge from the agencies’
discussions of—or failure to discuss—other prongs of the definition.183
Perhaps as important as the prongs of Dodd–Frank’s swap dealer
definition is the statute’s express exception for those who do not engage in
swap activities as part of a “regular business.”184 Here, too, the agencies
provide interpretive guidance, listing a number of indicators of a person’s
having a regular business of entering into swaps.185 These indicators include
“[e]ntering into swaps [to] satisf[y] the business or risk management needs
of the counterparty” and maintaining “staff and resources allocated to dealertype activities with counterparties.”186 However, here, too, market participants
must consider all of the facts and circumstances in determining whether the
exception applies, as the agencies decline to provide sharply defined criteria
for the “regular business” analysis. Because Dodd–Frank’s requirements and
“other forces” will cause transacting in swaps and the functioning of the swap
markets to evolve over time, the agencies observe, “it would be inappropriate
to craft per se exclusions from the swap dealer definition.”187

182. Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,609 (emphasis added). The agencies also note
that the factors they provided “as indicia of holding oneself out as a swap dealer” should “be
considered in the context of all the activities of the swap participant,” and “they are not per se
conclusive, and could be countered by other factors indicating that the person is not a swap
dealer.” Id.
183. See, e.g., Peter Madigan, The Club No-One Wants to Join: Swap Dealer Rules Remain Unclear,
RISK MAG. (June 1, 2012), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2175980/club-join-swapdealer-rules-remain-unclear (reporting concerns arising from the fact that the CFTC did not
define “regularly” in the third prong of the swap dealer definition); id. (reporting concerns that,
although the CFTC uses “occasionally” and “continuously” to elucidate the meaning of
“routinely” in the second prong of the swap dealer definition, it did not define those words).
184. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, § 721(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1658 (2010) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49) (2012)). One curious aspect of the agencies’ interpretation of this
exclusion is that they regard “as essentially synonymous” the phrases, “ordinary course of business,”
as used in the swap dealer definition, and “regular business,” as used in the exclusion to the swap
dealer definition. Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,610 (internal quotation marks omitted).
That the phrase “ordinary course of business” appears in only one of the swap dealer definition
prongs—a swap dealer is one who “regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary
course of business for its own account”—raises a question as to why, if the phrases are intended to
have the same meaning, Congress’s one exclusion from the swap dealer definition refers to only a
single prong of the multi-part definition and effectively says the same thing as that prong. Id. at
30,759 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Scott D. O’Malia) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(arguing that the two phrases have to mean different things based on canons of statutory
construction and indications of Congress’s intent); see also Dodd–Frank Act § 721(a) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49)).
185. See Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,610–11.
186. Id. at 30,610.
187. Id. at 30,611.
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Finally, as noted above, the agencies included in the swap dealer rules an
exclusion pursuant to which swaps that a person uses to hedge physical
positions that the person actually holds—for example, assets that the firm
owns or produces, liabilities that it has incurred, or services that it provides—
are not to be considered for purposes of determining whether the person is a
swap dealer.188 Thanks to that exclusion, then, entering into swaps to hedge
physical positions is “activity that will not be considered swap dealing
activity.”189 The exclusion makes sense, as far as it goes, since both Congress
and the agencies have recognized that entering into swaps for hedging
purposes is inconsistent with swap dealing, which generally is an activity
involving serving others’ swap-related needs.190 That apparent logic, however,
highlights the difficulty with the exclusion. By failing to exclude from
consideration all swaps entered into to hedge or mitigate commercial risk
(including those that hedge market risk or general economic risk, for
example), the agencies contemplate that, in at least some circumstances,
entering into swaps for hedging purposes constitutes swap-dealing activity.191
That result, in turn, produces the conclusion that the agencies contemplate
that at least some firms who use swaps solely to hedge commercial risks (other
than those associated with physical positions) could be legitimately regulated
as swap dealers, despite Congress’s apparent conclusion to the contrary.
The result is all the more troublesome given the rationale the agencies
provide to justify it. In particular, the agencies’ reluctance to exclude all swaps
used to hedge commercial risk stems from the possibility that a firm may enter
into swaps “for the purpose of accommodating the counterparty’s needs” or
otherwise in a manner “constitut[ing] swap dealing activity,” even though the
swaps also happen to have a “hedging consequence” for the firm.192 The
agencies suggest that those sorts of swaps should not be excluded from
consideration in determining swap dealer status.193 However, it is difficult to
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg)(6)(iii) (2014).
189. Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,613. That is not to say that other swaps that
mitigate commercial risk other than risks arising from physical positions will necessarily be
considered “swap dealing activity.” Rather, according to the agencies, “such [other] hedging
activity is to be considered in light of all other relevant facts and circumstances to determine
whether the person is engaging in activity (e.g., accommodating demand for swaps, making a
market for swaps, etc.) that makes the person a swap dealer.” Id.
190. See id. at 30,611 (“In general, entering into a swap for the purpose of hedging is
inconsistent with swap dealing.”); see also infra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing the
views of various Senate leaders that end users should not be subject to regulation as swap dealers).
191. The agencies expressly state as much. See Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,611
n.213 (“The absence of any explicit requirement in the ‘swap dealer’ definition to exclude swaps
held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk does not support the view that Congress intended
to categorically exclude all swaps that may serve as hedges in determining whether a person is
covered by the definition.”).
192. Id. at 30,613.
193. See id. (noting that there is no way to distinguish between those swaps and swaps entered
into for the purpose of hedging risk).
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see how a broader exclusion—one that excludes all hedging activity—would
encompass them, given another of the agencies’ guidelines: “The
exclusions . . . depend not on the effect or consequences of the swap but on
whether the purpose for which a person enters into a swap is to hedge . . . .”194
Under this guidance, if a firm enters into a swap for the purpose—or even
only partially for the purpose—of accommodating another market
participant’s needs or demands, there should be little doubt that the swap
would not fall within the exclusion, even if it served a hedging function for
the firm.
Because the swap dealer rules do not commit firmly to basing swap dealer
status on particular, readily identifiable factors, certain firms whose activities
fall outside of Congress’s conception of what a swap dealer is may become
subject to regulation as such, so long as their swap activities are more than de
minimis, and they do not limit their activities to hedging physical positions or
engaging in certain other transactions that need not be considered in
determining swap dealer status.195 These firms, of course, are the classic end
users, who rely on swaps solely to manage (hedge) certain risks associated with
their business operations. Such firms neither hold themselves out as willing
to deal in swaps nor do they have clients expecting them to do so, nor do they
enter into swaps as a regular business.196 Moreover, although regulatory safe
harbors are most important in contexts in which facts-and-circumstances
evaluations determine whether or not regulation applies, the agencies also
declined to construct such a comfort zone—or, at least, they declined to
construct one that extends as far as it needs to extend.197

194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Although discerning “congressional intent” is possibly a futile exercise, there are
indications that those members who were most instrumental in drafting Title VII did not intend
for swap dealer regulation to capture end users. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher Dodd,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, & Blanche Lincoln,
Chairwoman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, to Barney Frank, Chairman,
U.S. House Fin. Servs. Comm., & Colin Peterson, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Agric. (June
30, 2010), available at https://www.reit.com/sites/default/files/portals/0/2011JointEnd-User
MarginLetter.pdf (“Congress does not intend to regulate end-users as Major Swap Participants or
Swap Dealers just because they use swaps to hedge or manage the commercial risks.”); Letter
from Debbie Stabenow, Chairwoman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, &
Frank D. Lucas, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Agric., to the Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Mar. 29, 2012) (urging the CFTC “to finalize the
swap dealer definition in a manner that . . . will not impose significant new regulations on entities
Congress did not intend to be regulated as swap dealers” such as end users who use swaps to
hedge commercial risk).
196. In his dissent to the final rules regarding the swap dealer and other definitions,
Commissioner O’Malia voiced similar concerns, noting that the CFTC “essentially used the ‘swap
dealer’ definition to capture commercial end-users,” even though “Congress clearly precluded
this result.” Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,759 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Scott
D. O’Malia).
197. That is, the exclusion for swaps entered into to hedge physical positions could be viewed
as a (narrow) safe harbor.
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These concerns are far more than theoretical. During the comment
period for the swap dealer rules, for example, numerous firms—end users—
expressed their concerns that they would be considered swap dealers. Among
others, energy and food production companies that engaged in substantial
swap activities worried that those activities might be sufficiently extensive to
cause them to surpass the agencies’ de minimis threshold.198 For a firm caught
within the definition of swap dealer, moreover, the burdens of regulation as
a swap dealer are more than a small inconvenience, given the complex and
numerous regulatory requirements with which swap dealers must comply.199
In light of these concerns, the swap dealer rules could deter firms that would
otherwise use swaps from relying on them for risk-mitigation purposes—
particularly firms that are unable, based on the rules, to obtain complete
comfort that they are beyond regulation’s purview.200
The prospect that end users could be deemed swap dealers under the
agencies’ newly elaborated definition seems wholly inappropriate from yet
another perspective—namely, the rationale underlying Dodd–Frank. As an
initial matter, end users’ primary business activities are typically not related to
the financial markets but, instead, are centered on manufacturing,
production, and other “Main Street” endeavors.201 These firms, therefore,
arguably were not part of the cause of the financial crisis and did not benefit

198. See Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,760 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Scott
D. O’Malia) (observing that various energy and production companies “took the time to draft
and submit comment letters to the [CFTC] . . . because they were afraid of being defined as ‘swap
dealers’”); see also Alexander Osipovich, The Long and Winding Road to Dodd-Frank, ENERGY RISK
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.risk.net/energy-risk/feature/2164239/winding-road-dodd-frank
(noting that, in light of the swap dealer rules, many energy companies are uncertain as to whether
they are swap dealers).
199. See Madigan, supra note 183 (“Getting [the swap dealer definition] right is important
because something in the order of 1500 different regulatory requirements emanate from the
application of the swap dealer definition.” (quoting Luke Zubrod, director of the government
and regulatory advisory at Pennsylvaniabased interest rate and currency risk adviser Chatham
Financial) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. Some firms that submitted comment letters to the CFTC expressed this concern, noting
that uncertainty surrounding whether firms are swap dealers would cause end users to avoid using
swaps altogether. See, e.g., Letter from Walter L. Hawkins, Jr., Senior Vice President, Peabody
Energy Corp., to David A. Stawick, Secretary, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, and
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.
sec.gov/comments/s7-39-10/s73910-57.pdf. According to some, that result could, in turn,
expose businesses to market volatility, to the detriment of consumers. See Bachus Letter, supra
note 30, at 2 (contending that, if a too-broad definition of “swap dealer” drives end users from
the swap market, those businesses would become “exposed to market volatility and the
consequences will ultimately be felt by Americans in the form of increased consumer costs”).
201. Cf. Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,760 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Scott
D. O’Malia) (observing that “commercial end-users include Caterpillar, John Deere, and
ConAgra Foods,” which “have a regular business of supplying energy, food, and other tangible
products to America” (internal quotations omitted)).
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from the market conditions that spawned it.202 Rather, like so many others,
they were only harmed by it. Dodd–Frank reflects that fact, aiming its
regulatory fixes at those whose activities contributed most directly to the
crisis—namely, financial market professionals.203 The expansive swap dealer
rules upend that logic.
The rules’ inconsistency with the objectives behind Dodd–Frank is
evident as well in Dodd–Frank’s exclusion from the requirement that swap
transactions be cleared through a DCO. In particular, the statute expressly
exempts from the clearing requirement (and, therefore, the associated public
disclosure requirement) swaps entered into for hedging purposes by firms
that both use swaps only to mitigate commercial risk and are not “financial
entities,” a term that the statute defines to include financial institutions such
as broker–dealers, investment advisers, hedge funds, and banks—as well as
swap dealers.204 The “financial entity” definition, combined with the agencies’
rules, produces the anomalous result that an end user that uses swaps solely
to hedge business risks but that, for example, does so to an extent exceeding
the de minimis threshold may, by being deemed a swap dealer, also be deemed
a financial entity—a designation that deprives the firm of reliance on the
clearing exemption for end users.205 That prospect is all the more illogical in
light of the agencies’ claim that, in general, hedging activity and swap dealing
activity are mutually exclusive.206
Finally, the agencies’ approach to the swap dealer definition departs
from past regulatory approaches in the securities and commodity futures
contexts. The statutes, rules, and regulatory interpretations in those contexts
have, by-and-large, made fairly clear what types of persons are subject to
regulation. For example, an “investment adviser” under the securities laws is
a person who provides securities advisory services for compensation;207 a
“commodity trading advisor” under the CEA is one who performs a similar

202. See id. (“These [end users] suffered from—rather than perpetrated—the 2008 financial
crisis.”).
203. See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text (listing several of the categories of
persons and institutions that Dodd–Frank addresses).
204. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 723(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1679 (2010)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)(C) (2012)).
205. Commissioner O’Malia has noted the difficulty with the agencies’ approach. See Swap
Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,763 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Scott D. O’Malia)
(observing that, “if the [CFTC] defines ‘swap dealer’ expansively, then the [CFTC] will limit the
number and types of end-users that may use the clearing exception”).
206. See id. at 30,611; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the agencies’
position regarding swaps used for hedging purposes).
207. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2013) (“‘Investment
adviser’ means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . .
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities.”).
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role as to commodity futures.208 Determining whether a firm falls within either
of these definitions does not require reviewing extensive interpretive
guidance and is generally not a facts-and-circumstances analysis. Firms that do
not provide advice as to securities or commodities or that do so but do not
receive compensation in return are, quite simply, outside the bounds of
regulation.209
A clear demarcation between who falls into a regulatory category and
who does not both makes good sense and avoids the possibility that those
whom Congress did not intend to regulate nonetheless will become subject to
regulation. As Part IV elaborates, we should not want to regulate as swap
dealers—or as investment advisers or commodity trading advisors—those who
are in the role of end user, customer, client, or investor (whatever the
preferred label may be). In the swap context, those are the persons who enter
into specific swaps to hedge a particular risk based on their assessment of the
risk or reward deriving from a reference asset or liability—and who, most
often, pursue their swap activities only by obtaining the services of another
party, namely, a swap dealer.210
B. THE CROSS-BORDER RULES
Title VII provides that its requirements are not to apply to activities
outside the United States, unless those activities’ connection with U.S.
commerce or effect on U.S. commerce is “direct and significant.”211 In issuing
rules regarding swap regulation’s extraterritorial reach, the CFTC sought to
clarify what activities have such a connection with or effect on U.S.

208. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12)(A)(i)(I) (2013) (“‘[C]ommodity
trading advisor’ means any person who . . . for compensation or profit, engages in the business of
advising others . . . as to the value of or the advisability of trading in . . . any contract of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, security futures product, or swap.”).
209. To be sure, the absence of clear tests and workable safe harbors in the swap context may
further the worthy goal of preventing firms from gaming the rules and exploiting loopholes.
However, nowhere have the agencies suggested a concern with that objective, and, in any event,
they failed to conduct the necessary cost–benefit analysis regarding their regulatory approach in
relationship to that objective. See infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text (noting the necessity
of cost–benefit analysis in the CFTC’s rulemaking process).
210. See, e.g., Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 75 Fed.
Reg. 80,174, 80,177–78 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (“[N]on-dealers tend to enter into swaps with
swap dealers more often than with other non-dealers.”). But see Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 30,602 (noting commenters’ contention that, “in the market for energy swaps[,] . . . swaps
entered into directly by two end users are more frequent”).
211. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 722(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1673 (2010) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(i)). Dodd–Frank additionally provides that Title VII’s reach may extend
also to non-U.S. activities that contravene rules adopted by the CFTC to prevent the evasion of any
provision that Dodd–Frank added to the CEA, even if those activities do not have a direct and
significant relationship to U.S. commerce. Id. However, the CFTC did not base any of its crossborder rules on the “evasion” test, relying, instead, only on the “direct and significant” test.
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commerce.212 Like the rules pertaining to the definition of swap dealer,
however, those rules embody a too-expansive regulatory approach, capturing
activities whose relationship to U.S. commerce is neither direct nor
significant.213 Specifically, in its cross-border rulemaking, the agency
broadened the classes of persons within the scope of swap regulation and
overlooked inconsistencies between its regulatory approach and those of the
European Union and other jurisdictions, as well as the associated prospect
that some persons may be required to comply with two separate regulatory
regimes.214 After describing the CFTC’s unusual approach to promulgating
the cross-border rules, this Subpart discusses some of the ways in which the
cross-border rules are unduly broad and extend swap regulation beyond the
realm Congress sought to regulate. It turns first to the CFTC’s definition of
“U.S. person” and then to the agency’s approach to determining the rules to
which each category of swap participant will be subject.
1. Regulatory Approach
The cross-border rules are, in fact, not rules at all. As with any rulemaking
that a regulatory agency may undertake, the CFTC’s rulemaking process has
generally involved, for each rule, a multistep procedure involving proposing
the draft rule to the public and receiving and reviewing comments on the
proposal before adopting a final version.215 The Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946 (“APA”),216 a statute that was designed to ensure accountability in the
rulemaking process and that governs all agency rulemaking, requires those
procedures.217 Not all of the CFTC’s work assumed the form of rules, however,
as the previous Subpart’s discussion of the swap dealer rules demonstrates.
That is, the rulemaking process also required the agency to consider whether
interim “rules” should be implemented as transitional steps before full
compliance with various final rules would be required and whether the
particular circumstances of various persons that otherwise might be subject to
212. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 (July 26, 2013) [hereinafter Cross-Border Rules] (setting
forth the CFTC’s guidance regarding Title VII’s extraterritorial application).
213. Other observers, including one of the CFTC’s own commissioners, have voiced similar
concerns. See id. at 45,371–72 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Scott D. O’Malia) (describing
the cross-border rules as “overbroad” and without adequate grounding in the “direct and
significant” standard).
214. See infra notes 233–39 (describing some of the problems arising from the CFTC’s
approach to the cross-border rules).
215. The SEC and the CFTC complied with these steps, for example, in connection with their
adoption of the swap dealer rules. See Swap Dealer Release, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,596 (noting that,
prior to their adoption of the final swap dealer rules, the agencies proposed draft swap dealer
rules, received 968 written comments on them, and held 114 meetings with swap participants).
216. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
217. See, e.g., Case Comment, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549
(D.C. Cir. 1993), 107 HARV. L. REV. 1819, 1821 n.21 (1994) (“The primary purpose of the
Administrative Procedure Act is to provide a series of procedural checks on administrative agencies.”).
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a rule counseled in favor of exempting those persons from the rule’s reach.
The CFTC addressed many of these questions through either interpretive
guidance or so-called “no-action” letters—meaning that the agency presumed
to alter the scope of various final rules informally, rather than through the
more formal, and time-consuming, rulemaking process that the APA
mandates.218
By-and-large, the CFTC employed the tool of interpretive guidance
around the edges, as it were, of the rulemaking process, to ease market
participants into compliance or to explain or limit certain rules’ applicability.
The cross-border rules are an exception, in that, rather than formulate any of
them as actual rules, the CFTC promulgated all of them as interpretive
guidance.219 (This Article nevertheless refers to the collective content of the
guidance as the “cross-border rules,” given that the CFTC appears to regard
that content as enforceable rules.220) Because the cross-border rules were not
the product of the normal agency rulemaking process—they are not rules,
after all—they were birthed outside the scope of the APA’s safeguards and
without an evaluation of whether their benefits exceed their costs,221 as the
CEA requires.222 However, despite the fact that the cross-border rules do not
have the force of rules, the CFTC has suggested that they are mandatory,
seemingly wanting both to have its cake and to eat it.223
218. Cf. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, CFTC RELIEF AND GUIDANCE AS THE “SWAP” DEFINITION
TAKES EFFECT 1 (2012), available at http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Public
ation_CFTC_Relief_and_Guidance_as_the_Swap_Definition_Takes_Effect.pdf (describing the
“unprecedented 13 interpretive and no-action letters” that the CFTC issued in October 2012,
which “provide clarifications and relief in a number of areas”); CFTC Issues Range of Swap-Related
Interpretive Guidance and No-Action Relief, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.
goodwinprocter.com/Dodd-Frank/Publications/Newsletter%20Articles/Financial%20Services%
20Articles/2012_12/26_08.aspx (describing the no-action exemptive relief that the CFTC
granted in December 2012).
219. See Peter Madigan, CFTC Cross-Border Guidance “Has the Feel of a Rule,” Lawyers Agree, RISK
MAG. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2320806/cftc-cross-borderguidance-has-the-feel-of-a-rule-lawyers-agree (discussing the CFTC’s issuance of “guidance on how
to apply its Dodd–Frank regulations to cross-border and overseas trades, rather than binding rules”).
220. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
221. See Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,373 (July 26, 2013) (dissenting
statement of Comm’r Scott D. O’Malia) (noting that, by issuing the cross-border rules as
interpretive guidance, the CFTC avoided complying with the APA’s safeguards and “also avoided
analyzing the costs and benefits of its actions pursuant to section [19](a) of the CEA”).
222. See 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2013) (“Before promulgating a regulation under this chapter
or issuing an order . . . the [CFTC] shall consider the costs and benefits of the action.”).
223. See Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,372 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Scott
D. O’Malia) (noting that the cross-border rules “set[] out standards that [they] contemplate[]
will be regularly applied by [CFTC] staff to cross-border activities” and that the CFTC has issued
“no-action letters . . . in connection with compliance obligations that have essentially been
imposed” by the rules); id. at 45,371 (statement of Chairman Gary Gensler) (The Cross-Border
Rules “provide [] that swap dealers, foreign or U.S., transacting with U.S. persons . . . must comply
with Dodd–Frank’s swap market reform.”); Complaint, supra note 9, at 33 (observing that various
orders issued by the CFTC providing exemptive relief from compliance with certain cross-border
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The CFTC’s evasion of the APA’s and the CEA’s rulemaking
requirements is especially problematic because the agency issued the crossborder rules after it had adopted final versions of most of its other swap rules,
for which it had adhered to applicable rulemaking strictures.224 Although the
agency provided cost–benefit analyses for those rules, it did not factor in costs
associated with the rules’ cross-border application—even though the rules’
extraterritorial reach could dramatically affect costs and even though, with
each rule the agency proposed, market participants urged it to consider
extraterritorial application contemporaneously with the rule rather than at
some point in the future.225 Indeed, that the CFTC had not addressed the
other rules’ extraterritorial application when it proposed them is its ostensible
reason for its decision not to promulgate the cross-border rules as actual
“rules.” It believed that, had it done so, it would have had to re-propose each
of the previously adopted rules.226
2. U.S. Person Definition
The CFTC’s impermissibly informal approach to rulemaking arguably
produced cross-border rules that are more encompassing than they otherwise
would be.227 In that regard, the agency’s definition of “U.S. person”—the

rules “would have been unnecessary, if not for the purposeful binding effect of the Cross-Border
Rule[s]”).
224. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 11 (explaining that the CFTC issued its cross-border rules
only after it adopted final swap rules pertaining to “registration, documentation, business
conduct, reporting, trade execution, recordkeeping, and mandatory clearing”).
225. See id. (contending that, in proposing and adopting the other swap rules, the CFTC
ignored the concerns “commenters repeatedly expressed” regarding “the rules’ extraterritorial
application” and that, therefore, “[t]he cost-benefit evaluation required by the CEA [as to those
other rules is] fundamentally flawed”).
226. See Madigan, supra note 219 (noting that, because “many other Dodd–Frank Act [swap]
rules were already in place by the time the [cross-border rules] [were] first proposed in July
2012,” the CFTC feared that issuing formal cross-border rules would require the agency to
“repropose each of those earlier rules”).
227. The difficulties arising from the cross-border rules are highlighted by the controversy
surrounding the CFTC’s November 14, 2013, clarification of some of them. See generally Gary
Barnett, Director, Div. of Swap Dealer & Intermediary Oversight, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, No. 13-69, Applicability of Transaction-Level Requirements to Activity in
the United States (2013). In that release, the CFTC further extended the scope of the swap rules
to encompass transactions “between a non-U.S. swap dealer and a non-U.S. counterparty booked
outside the U.S. . . . if the trade involves ‘personnel or agents’ located in the U.S.” Madigan, supra
note 219. Several major swap-industry associations perceived the unilaterally expanded guidance
as extending U.S. swap regulation far beyond activities with “direct and significant” connections
to U.S. commerce and, according to one of their attorneys, viewed it as “the straw that broke the
camel’s back.” See id. On December 4, 2013, those associations—the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, and the
Institute of International Bankers—sued the CFTC, requesting that the court vacate the crossborder rules and “enjoin the CFTC from implementing, enforcing, or giving any extraterritorial
effect to its swaps regulation until it promulgates a rule that specifies their extraterritorial
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category designating who is squarely within the CFTC’s regulatory
jurisdiction—is an appropriate place to begin. If, under the CFTC’s “U.S.
person” definition, a person so qualifies, then that person is subject to the full
effect of Dodd–Frank’s provisions on swaps and the CFTC’s swap rules.228 So,
for example, the person must register as a swap dealer or major swap
participant if the person meets the definition for either category and must
comply with other relevant requirements, such as clearing and transaction
reporting requirements, to the extent required in light of the person’s swaprelated activities.229 The “U.S. person definition” is important also because of
its effect on non-U.S. persons. Under the cross-border rules, non-U.S. persons
dealing with U.S. persons or their non-U.S. affiliates may also become subject
to particular components of the swap rules.230
The definition, like most definitions of U.S. person or similar terms
elsewhere in the CFTC’s rules, as well as those under the securities laws,
provides that natural persons that live in the United States, most entities that
are organized or have a principal place of business in the United States, and
trusts governed by the laws of any U.S. state are U.S. persons.231 More
controversial is the prong of the definition under which a collective
investment vehicle, such as a commodity pool or a hedge fund, is a U.S.
person if it is majority-owned by the types of U.S. persons described above,
even though the fund may be organized under the laws of another country
and may be managed by a non-U.S. asset manager.232
By capturing entities based on their ownership, the U.S. person
definition has the predictable effect of subjecting funds that are already
subject to swap regulation in another jurisdiction to the full range of Title
VII’s provisions and the CFTC’s swap rules as well, to the extent applicable
based on the fund’s activities.233 Moreover, in those circumstances, there is no

application consistent with the requirements of the APA and the CEA.” Complaint, supra note 9,
at 2, 6.
228. See Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,347 (July 26, 2013) (noting that U.S.
persons that are swap dealers or major swap participants “generally would be expected to comply
in full with all Entity-Level Requirements and Transaction-Level Requirements, without
substituted compliance available”).
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., id. at 45,361 (setting forth the requirements applicable to transactions in which
neither party is a swap dealer or a major swap participant, and at least one party is a U.S. person);
id. at 45,364 (setting forth the requirements applicable to transactions in which neither party is
a swap dealer or a major swap participant, both parties are non-U.S. persons, and at least one
party is a “guaranteed or conduit affiliate” of a U.S. person).
231. See id. at 45,316–17 (setting forth the CFTC’s interpretation of “U.S. person” for
purposes of CEA section 2(i)).
232. See id. at 45,317 (including as a “U.S. person” a collective investment vehicle that is
majority-owned by U.S. persons).
233. See Kris Devasabai, U.S. Person Problems: Hedge Funds Caught in Transatlantic Tug-of-War, RISK
MAG. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2324313/us-person-problems-
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possibility that a fund may satisfy U.S. regulatory requirements by complying
with equivalent regulations of the fund’s “home” jurisdiction, as might be
possible if the fund were a non-U.S. person subject to certain of the CFTC’s
rules by virtue of its activities.234 Under the cross-border rules’ concept of
“substituted compliance,” the CFTC may regard a person’s “compliance with
a comparable and comprehensive regulatory requirement of a” non-U.S.
jurisdiction to be an acceptable substitute for the person’s compliance with
the (otherwise) applicable requirement under U.S. law.235 Substituted
compliance, however, is not available for persons deemed to be U.S. persons
and, on that basis, squarely within the CFTC’s regulatory scope.236
Accordingly, those funds falling within the scope of regulation in two
jurisdictions may be subject to two complete regulatory regimes, each with its
own set of rules and requirements, which may not be compatible with one
another.237 For example, hedge funds based in another jurisdiction, such as
the Cayman Islands, that are managed by European investment advisers may
be subject to European regulation.238 However, if the funds have a sufficient
magnitude of U.S investors, they would be deemed U.S. persons and,
therefore, also subject to U.S. regulation.239
Perhaps more problematic still—and presumably stemming from the fact
that the U.S. person definition is framed as interpretive guidance—is that the
U.S. person definition, as a whole, is, by its express terms, malleable,
hedge-funds-caught-in-transatlantic-tug-of-war (describing the plight of certain European fund
managers operating funds that are majority-owned by U.S. persons).
234. See id. (“If a fund qualifies as a US person, then it is expected to follow rules laid down
by the [CFTC]—substituted compliance is not available.”).
235. Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,295. Substituted compliance may be available if
the CFTC “determine[s] that certain laws and regulations of a foreign jurisdiction are
comparable to and as comprehensive as a corresponding category of U.S. laws and regulations.”
Id. at 45,340. In the event the CFTC so determines, a firm or transaction in that jurisdiction that
is subject to the U.S. regulation as to which comparability applies “will be deemed to be in
compliance therewith if that [firm] or transaction complies with the corresponding foreign laws
and regulations.” Id. For a more detailed discussion of substituted compliance, see Sean J.
Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives
Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1334–35 (2014).
236. See Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,347 (noting that substituted compliance is
not available for U.S. persons).
237. See Devasabai, supra note 233 (noting that the U.S. and European swap regulatory
regimes are incompatible in some respects). For example, under European rules, “a firm clearing
its OTC trades must be offered a choice of . . . omnibus [or] individual [asset] segregation.” Id.
The CFTC’s rules, by contrast, permit just one approach (“legal segregation with operational
commingling”). Id. Although European regulations may accept a person’s compliance with
another applicable jurisdiction’s regulation as a substitute for compliance with EU regulations—
a prospect known as “equivalence”—that is a possibility only as to jurisdictions that the EU has
approved. See id.
238. See id. (describing the circumstances under which “a Cayman-domiciled fund with an
EU-based manager” would be subject to European swap regulation).
239. See id. (noting that a Cayman Islands-domiciled fund would be subject to U.S. swap
regulation if it is majority-owned by U.S. persons).
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depending on particular circumstances. The definition is prefaced by the
assertion that “the [CFTC] will interpret the term ‘U.S. person’ generally to
include, but not be limited to.”240 With that preface, the agency has given itself
(very un-rule-like) leeway to determine that a person not falling within the
definition should nonetheless be treated as a U.S. person for purposes of Title
VII and the swap rules—a discretion that weakens market participants’ ability
to be certain that they are in compliance with all regulation that applies to
them. Similarly, in the cross-border rules’ discussion of the principal place of
business of a collective investment vehicle, the CFTC notes that the agency
“does not intend to establish bright line tests for when the principal place of
business of a collective investment vehicle would or would not be within the
United States.”241 To be sure, most such “vehicles”—again, funds—likely will
not be in the gray area, but the prospect of there being a gray area in the first
place regarding whether the CFTC’s complex web of rules applies is another
indicator that the agency’s cross-border approach is not as principled as it
ought to be.
It may seem that the CFTC’s U.S. person definition is troublesome
primarily because it appears to extend U.S. regulation beyond the realm that
Congress intended. To be sure, that concern is, by itself, important. For
present purposes, however, the most significant difficulty with the definition
is that it serves to extend the CFTC’s problematic approach to the swap dealer
definition to swap participants worldwide.
3. Extraterritorial Application
The definition of U.S. person is only the beginning. What follows in the
cross-border rules, among other things, is an elaborate discussion of the
circumstances under which a non-U.S. person may be required to register as
a swap dealer or a major swap participant, a determination that turns on
factors such as whether the person is guaranteed by, or is a “conduit
affiliate”242 of, a U.S. person and whether the notional value of the person’s
swap transactions with counterparties (aggregated with those of its non-U.S.
affiliates243) who are U.S. persons and guaranteed affiliates of U.S. persons

240. Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,316.
241. Id. at 45,311.
242. The CFTC uses the terms “guaranteed affiliate” and “conduit affiliate” to mean,
respectively, “a non-U.S. person that is an affiliate of a U.S. person” whose liabilities are
“guaranteed by [the] U.S. person,” and “[a] non-U.S. person that is majority-owned . . . by a U.S.
person” and that “regularly enters into swaps with one or more of its U.S. affiliates of its U.S.
person owner,” provided that the non-U.S. person’s financial statements are included in its
owner’s consolidated financial statements. Id. at 45,318–19, 45,357.
243. See id. at 45,320–23 (setting forth the CFTC’s aggregation principles); Complaint, supra
note 9, at 42 (“The [cross-border rules] . . . require[] non-U.S. entities . . . to aggregate their
swaps with the swaps of every other affiliate ‘under common control,’ including other non-U.S.
entities.”).
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exceeds the de minimis threshold.244 As part of this discussion, the cross-border
rules articulate a taxonomy of the other swap rules—covering both the rules
that are applicable only to swap dealers and major swap participants and those
that may apply to other swap participants, such as clearing and reporting
obligations.245 The rules first divide the other swap rules into an “entity level”
category and a “transaction level” category, based on whether a particular rule
is deemed to apply to a firm as a whole or only to discrete swap transactions.246
They then further divide these groupings into sub-categories based on the
purpose of a rule.247
With that groundwork in place, the cross-border rules set forth the
CFTC’s policies regarding:
●

The circumstances under which U.S.-person and non-U.S.-person
swap dealers and major swap participants are subject to the rules
within each subcategory,

●

The circumstances under which particular rules—in particular,
those rules, discussed in Part II, whose applicability does not depend
on swap dealer or major swap participant status—apply in
connection with cross-border swaps as to which neither party is a
swap dealer or a major swap participant, and

●

The circumstances under which compliance with a particular rule
may be satisfied through substituted compliance.248

To provide a brutishly simplified summary of those policies: U.S. swap
dealers and major swap participants are subject to all of the entity-level
requirements and all of the transactional-level requirements.249 For their part,
non-U.S. swap dealers and major swap participants are subject to the entitylevel requirements but, in some cases, may be able to rely on substituted
compliance, while the applicability of the transactional-level rules to any
244. See Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,318–20 (opining that, in determining
whether it is a swap dealer or a major swap participant based on having met the de minimis
threshold, a non-U.S. person that is not a guaranteed or conduit affiliate of a U.S. person need
count only those swaps that it enters into with U.S. persons and guaranteed affiliates of U.S.
persons (with three exceptions)).
245. See id. at 45,331–40.
246. See id. at 45,331–33 (describing entity-level requirements); id. at 45,333–35 (describing
transaction-level requirements).
247. See id. at 45,331–35 (discussing the sub-categories within each category). According to
the CFTC, the rules in the first subcategory of the entity-level category are aimed at mitigating
firm risks, while those in the second category are intended to assist the CFTC in its market
oversight. See id. at 45,331–33. As for the transaction-level category, the first subcategory
encompasses rules designed to mitigate risk and promote transparency, while the second category
encompasses “external business conduct standards,” which may not need “to apply to swaps
between non-U.S. persons taking place outside the United States.” Id. at 45,335–36.
248. See id. at 45,348–64.
249. See id. at 45,348, 45,350–51, 45,359–60 (setting forth the entity-level and transactionlevel requirements applicable to U.S swap dealers and U.S. major swap participants).
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particular transaction depends on the identity of the counterparty—for
example, whether the counterparty is a U.S. person or a foreign branch of a
U.S. person or, if not, whether it is an affiliate or conduit of a U.S. person.250
As for swaps between two persons (whether U.S. or non-U.S.) that are neither
swap dealers nor major swap participants, the applicability of the swap rules
to any particular transaction depends on whether either party is a U.S. person
or whether, instead, both parties are non-U.S. persons251 and, if the latter,
whether either party is a guaranteed affiliate or a conduit affiliate252 of a U.S.
person and, if so, whether the “inter-affiliate” exemption might apply.253
As this short description suggests, the cross-border rules are exquisitely
complex. Of course, complexity is not, in-and-of-itself, a problem from the
standpoint of furthering Dodd–Frank’s goals and regulatory coherence,
although that is a question for additional analysis. In the context of the crossborder rules, complexity is a problem because it is a product of the too-broad
range of extraterritorial persons and activities over which the CFTC deems its
swap rules to apply. By extending the rules so far, the agency inevitably
confronted not only questions about how and whether to lessen the prospect
of duplicative regulation, but also the need to address, for each possible type
of would-be regulatory subject and each rule, myriad permutations based on
the possible counterparties those subjects might have. And that is what it did.
More specifically, it compiled a set of policies that, as to any particular swap
transaction, are likely to apply if the transaction is to any degree connected to
the United States or a U.S. person, even if the transaction has more substantial
connections to a non-U.S. jurisdiction—one that may have a substantially
different approach to swap regulation.254
250. See id. at 45,348–50, 45,351–53, 45,360–61 (setting forth the entity-level and
transaction-level requirements applicable to non-U.S swap dealers and non-U.S. major swap
participants).
251. In the former circumstance, all of the non-registrant rules apply, without the possibility
of substituted compliance. See id. at 45,361–63. In the latter circumstance, if neither party is a
guaranteed or conduit affiliate only the recordkeeping requirement applies and, even then, only
if one of the parties qualifies as a “large trader.” See id. at 45,363–64. However, if either party is
guaranteed by a U.S. person or a conduit of a U.S. person, then additional non-registrant rules
will apply. See id. at 45,364.
252. For the definitions of “guaranteed affiliate” and “conduit affiliate,” see supra note 242.
253. See Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,362, 45,364.
254. Beyond concerns about the breadth of the cross-border rules are concerns that they are
not internally consistent. For example, CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia noted in his dissent to
the agency’s approval of the cross-border rules that the CFTC is “inconsistent[] and arbitrar[y]” in
its determination that certain swap rules “satisfy the ‘direct and significant’ standard under section
2(i).” Id. at 45,372. As an example, Commissioner O’Malia cited the requirement that swap
transactions be publicly reported, which does not address systemic contagion, and clearing
requirements, which do. See id. Although the CFTC deems both to be transaction-level
requirements (and, hence, applicable extraterritorially), it fails to explain why. See id.
Commissioner O’Malia also noted his concern “that the [cross-border rules] [are] overlapping,
duplicative, and perhaps even contradictory with other provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act that
mitigate systemic risk.” Id. at 45,374.
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Accordingly, the CFTC’s approach produces the same concerns as those
that have arisen regarding the swap dealer rules.255 More precisely, it
reinforces the agency’s expansive definition of U.S. person and, together with
that definition, expands the already-untenably broad scope of swap dealer
regulation to corners of the globe that one might have supposed were beyond
U.S. regulatory reach. As Part IV contends, moreover, the approach neither
serves the interests of workable and efficient regulation nor comports with
Title VII’s regulatory temperament.
IV. RETHINKING SWAP REGULATION’S FOUNDATIONS
Now that the dust has mostly settled, it is possible to evaluate Dodd–
Frank’s swap regulation, as supplemented by the rules adopted by the CFTC.
As anticipated, the CFTC’s efforts have fundamentally sculpted Title VII’s
regulatory framework. Perhaps less expected is that those efforts have also
produced a financial regulatory regime that departs—inappropriately—from
regulators’ previous episodes of financial market regulation. This Part both
critiques the CFTC’s approach to rulemaking under Dodd–Frank and
provides an alternative model: Subpart A first assesses the swap rules,
contending that their deficiencies derive from the CFTC’s narrow focus on
the pretending inherent in swaps. Taking the next step, Subpart B asserts that
the swap rules would be both more coherent and more effective if they were
predicated on the speculation that necessarily is a component of financial
market transactions—whether involving swaps or securities.
A. PRETENDING V. INVESTING
The CFTC’s approach to adopting rules under Title VII of Dodd–Frank
is misguided. More specifically, the rules—many of them, at least—are
inconsistent with some of the core objectives of swap regulation and hinder
the realization of well-functioning, productive, and systemically stabile swap
markets. We might even say, then, that, as a result of the CFTC’s rulemaking
approach, swap regulation in the aftermath of that rulemaking looks
substantially different than it did beforehand based on the blueprint supplied
by Dodd–Frank.
And what was the CFTC’s approach? As Part II asserts, the swap rules
reflect a particular conception of swaps, in which swaps are instruments
predicated on pretense.256 That is, each swap is a contract that involves
pretending by both parties to it—each, in a sense, making or receiving
payments based on the value of a particular asset that neither party may own
and that, in any event, has no formal relationship to the swap itself.257

255. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text (describing the swap dealer rules’ likely
impact on end users).
256. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing how swap transactions involve pretending).
257. See supra Part II.A.1.
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Although one party might separately have exposure to the reference asset, the
swap itself does not involve the purchase or sale of the reference asset.258 As
this Subpart contends, this approach to regulation is problematic because the
rules it has produced are grounded on a conception of what swaps are, rather
than on an understanding of the risks they create.
The CFTC’s implicitly pretense-based conception of regulation is not
devoid of logic. That logic is evident when one considers that pretending
markedly distinguishes transacting in swaps from what is perhaps the cardinal
financial market transaction—namely, investing in securities. Fundamental to
“investing” in securities is the process whereby an investor, for example,
contributes funds or other assets to a firm in return for an ownership interest
that the investor hopes will increase in value over time. Or, rather than
purchase her ownership interest directly from the firm, the investor might
purchase it from other investors who are seeking to dispose of their ownership
interests. Either way, through an investor’s act of obtaining an ownership
interest in a firm, an investor purchases something that has value in its own
right: a share of stock or other equity interest (a security), which derives its
value from the firm’s success—or, more accurately, its managers’ success—in
deploying the firm’s equity capital, rather than from another asset wholly
unrelated to itself and with which it has no connection.
We might say, therefore, that investing is one-sided, or unilateral, in that
the parties to a securities transaction do not mutually engage in the same
activity. That is, they do not both engage in the act of investing. By contrast, in
pretending, the parties to a swap pretend equally. Recall that not only a swap’s
value but also the obligations of each party under the swap are based on the
reference asset, and neither party need bear any risk relating to the reference
asset apart from that created by the swap itself.259 In the contractual
relationship that is the swap, the parties jointly pretend that one (or both) of
them has purchased, sold, borrowed, or loaned the reference asset.260 We
might say, then, that a swap transaction is two-sided, or bilateral.
The CFTC’s approach to the swap rules might be viewed as an antisecurities regulatory approach in that, if participation in a swap transaction
involves pretending, investing in a security involves anything but. If,
moreover, the world of securities investing is unilateral rather than bilateral,
then surely it is reasonable for swap regulation to look substantively different
from securities regulation. And, thanks to the CFTC’s rulemaking, it does.
Whereas securities regulation imposes obligations primarily on firms that
issue securities and persons that act as intermediaries in securities

258.
259.
260.

See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the structure of swaps).
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the role of the reference asset).
See supra Part II.A.1.
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transactions, rather than on purchasers of securities, the swap rules extend
Title VII to encompass virtually everyone.261
This conclusion is evident in the CFTC’s rules elaborating who is a swap
dealer and defining swap regulation’s extraterritorial application. In their
swap dealer rulemaking, the CFTC and the SEC effectively created a facts-andcircumstances test, eschewing clear and articulable boundaries for who
qualifies as a swap dealer and who does not. As a result, the rules effectively
echo the bilateral pretense that all swaps involve. The fact of (mutual)
pretending entails that if one party is regulated as a “dealer,” the other party
should be as well, at least if that “other” party transacts in swaps fairly regularly.
The cross-border rules, for their part, countenance no clear boundaries to the
CFTC’s authority to regulate swaps.262 Accordingly, a large swath of swap
participants worldwide—regardless of whether they are U.S. persons—may be
subject to at least some components of the U.S. swap regulatory regime,
depending on who their counterparties happen to be.263
Yet the suggestion above—that swap regulation is, and should be,
bilateral because swap contracts are based on mutual pretense and that
securities regulation is, and should be, unilateral because securities
transactions are defined by the un-mutual activity of investing—is inadequate.
It is inadequate because it reflects only the nature of swaps versus securities.
It does not reflect the relative status of the parties to a transaction or the
relative risks that the transaction creates. Far from revealing additional
distinctions between the swap and securities contexts, an evaluation of these
factors highlights characteristics that the two contexts share—characteristics
that are more salient, for purposes of formulating regulation, than the nature
of the two instruments.
Let us return to the notion that a securities transaction involves the sale
of a security. Axiomatically, in that transaction, one party is the seller (whether
it be the issuer, another investor, or an intermediary), and the other is the
buyer. That refocusing of the transaction from what happens in the
transaction to the different roles of the parties to the transaction builds a
bridge to the swap context. In particular, despite the mutual activities that
define the relationship between swap counterparties, those parties similarly
have different roles––one party is typically a financial market professional,
and the other is typically an end user or other “buy side” firm.264 The

261. See supra Part III (describing the ways in which the swap dealer rules and cross-border
rules cover, or potentially cover, both parties to a swap).
262. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the breadth of the cross-border rules).
263. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 38 (asserting that “[t]he Cross Border Rule[s] focus[]
largely on the status of market participants—such as whether one entity is a subsidiary of, or
‘guaranteed’ by, another—not their actual ‘activities,’ as [CEA] Section 2(i) requires”).
264. See Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures? The Inadequacies of Applying the
Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 382 (1999)

KRUG_PP_TO_AU (DO NOT DELETE)

1608

4/13/2015 3:01 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1559

distinction between investing and pretending says nothing about whether, by
virtue of being in one role or the other for any transaction, a party is at a
relative disadvantage or advantage to the other party.
The distinction, therefore, is problematic as a basis of regulation because,
in fact, as in the securities context, the parties to a swap, situated in different
roles as they are, are not situated equally. Only one party has an advantage in
each of the most pertinent aspects of the parties’ relationship: control,
expertise, and information. And only one party is in a substantially better
position than the other to conduct its activities (or not) so as to serve the cause
of tempering systemic instability and ensuring the integrity of financial
market transactions.
That is the historic insight of securities regulation. As outlined above,
securities regulation may be characterized as a unilateral mode of regulation,
but that is not due to the mere fact that, in a securities transaction, only one
party invests. Rather, securities regulation is unilateral because it focuses on
those with the relative knowledge and, therefore, the relative power. It seeks
to ensure that those with whom those persons transact either have power in
their own right—they are sophisticated or have bargaining power—or are
given access to all relevant information.265 It seeks, in other words, to reduce
the parties’ unequal status, in the name of protecting investors and promoting
market integrity.
Accordingly, apart from the concerns surrounding whether the CFTC’s
approach to the swap dealer rules unjustifiably departs from approaches used
in other rulemaking contexts or whether its approach to the cross-border
rules actually accords with APA requirements,266 the swap rules counter their
own objectives.267 Both Congress and, ostensibly, the CFTC recognize that,
although swap transactions need to be appropriately regulated, they are an
important component of liquid and robust financial markets, and regulation
should enable their continued uses and functions. It is difficult to see how
those objectives are achievable if end users may be regulated as swap dealers
(“Usually, parties desiring to enter into swap agreements do not find each other, but rather transact
their swap agreements with a swap dealer making a market in certain swap transactions.”).
265. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976–1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 95,779, at 90,820 (S.D. Ga. 1976), (noting that “equalization of bargaining positions” is “[a]
common thread running through the fabric of the various securities cases”); Jackson v. Bache &
Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (“Rule 10b–5 has been utilized to inject some degree
of bargaining equality into the purchase and sale of securities.”).
266. For a discussion of these concerns, see supra text accompanying notes 207–09, 215–23.
267. See, e.g., Cross-Border Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,293 (July 26, 2013) (“[Dodd–Frank]
was enacted to reduce systemic risk . . . increase transparency, and promote market integrity.”); CrossBorder Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
41,214, 41,226 (proposed July 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter Proposed
Cross-Border Rules] (stating that “the [CEA’s] trade execution requirement furthers [Dodd–Frank’s]
goals of financial stability, market efficiency and enhanced transparency”); Swap Dealer Release, 77
Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,596 (May 23, 2012) (“Title VII . . . established a statutory framework to reduce
risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity within the financial system.”).
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regardless of whether their activities place them in a position of knowledge
and power relative to other market participants268 and if end users or others
may be subject to the complete regulation of two separate jurisdictions,
regardless of the effects of their activities on U.S. commerce269 and who they
are or where they may be located.270
In short, the bilateral approach to the swap rules is troublesome in light
of the ways in which the swap markets function. Although both parties to a
swap pretend, typically only one of them will have as its business the activity of
transacting in swaps. Yet, thanks to the swap rules, swap regulation—and its
burdens—capture not only that party but also its customers and clients, such
as commercial entities that use swaps to mitigate their exposures to certain
types of risks.271 While the swap “professional” may be in no better position
than its end user counterparty to evaluate the profitability prospects of a
swap’s reference asset and, therefore, the swap itself, that party’s activities
present solvency risks to its counterparty, as the next Subpart explains.272
Moreover, that party is undoubtedly in a better position to confront and
address the concerns that led to swap regulation in the first place: swap
transactions that, in the aggregate, create systemic instability and
contagion.273 In these respects, the two parties to a swap—end user, on the

268. See supra notes 173–206 and accompanying text (describing the CFTC’s interpretation
of the “swap dealer” definition).
269. Then-CFTC Commissioner Jill Sommers made the following observation regarding the
CFTC’s cross-border rulemaking:
[The CFTC] staff ha[s] been guided by what could only be called the “Intergalactic
Commerce Clause” of the United States Constitution, in that every single swap a U.S.
person enters into, no matter what the swap or where it was transacted, was stated to
have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of
the United States. This statutory and constitutional analysis of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law was, in my view, nothing short of extra-statutory and extraconstitutional.
Proposed Cross-Border Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 41,239 (statement of Comm’r Jill Sommers).
270. However, based on the contentions in a lawsuit brought by the swap industry’s major
participants, that appears to be their effect, as non-U.S. firms—already subject to regulation in
their home jurisdictions—eschew transactions with U.S. swap counterparties in an effort to
become subject to U.S. swap regulation. See supra note 227 (explaining the lawsuit’s background);
see also Complaint, supra note 9, at 44 (contending that, because “The Cross Border Rule[s]
appl[y] the Title VII Rules to foreign entities or entities engaging in foreign transactions,” they
“impos[e] costly, often duplicative” requirements, which “discourages entities from engaging in
transactions with persons in the United States”). CFTC Commissioner O’Malia has expressed
similar concerns. See Cross-Border Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45,374 (dissenting statement of Comm’r
Scott D. O’Malia) (“I . . . am concerned about whether the [Cross-Border Rules] create[] an
uneven playing field for U.S. firms, which would be a plainly unacceptable outcome to me.”).
271. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 44.
272. See infra notes 296–303 and accompanying text (describing “counterparty risk”).
273. See supra notes 73–93 and accompanying text (describing the role of swaps in the
financial crisis).
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one hand, and financial market professional, on the other—are far from
equally positioned.
Indeed, consider, once again, the securities context. A similar approach
to that embraced by the CFTC would have issuer (or intermediary) and
investor subject to the same regulation, even though, as noted, the very
purpose of securities regulation—protecting investors and promoting market
integrity—is to reduce the imbalance of power between issuer and investor.274
This insight is not intended to diminish the differences between securities
transactions and swap transactions. Investing in securities is a fundamentally
different activity from transacting in swaps and engaging in the pretending
that it necessitates. The point, rather, is that, from the perspective of
formulating workable, effective regulation, the distinction is far less important
than the factor that unites investing and pretending—namely, that both
securities and swaps are financial market instruments that center on the risks
and rewards of speculation.
B. SPECULATION
The preceding discussions give rise to the question: what might be a
better regulatory approach? To begin that analysis, we return again to the
securities regulatory context. Despite the differences one might perceive
between securities investing and transacting in swaps, the rationales for
regulating the securities markets, on the one hand, and the swap markets, on
the other, are strikingly similar. Like swap regulation, securities regulation is
concerned with ensuring market integrity. Of course, an associated goal of
securities regulation is protecting investors—those who place their capital at
risk in the securities markets—while swap regulation may be said to have more
of a system-wide focus: It seeks to ensure systemic stability. But whether the
immediate focus is protecting investors or whether it is protecting the
financial system, it is not difficult to see that these emphases are symbiotic and
promote one another. A systemically stable financial system protects investors,
and protecting investors through disclosure and transparency supports the
stability of the financial system.
Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that there are additional
similarities between the rationale for securities regulation and the rationale
for swap regulation. In its formulation of a securities regulatory regime after
the Depression, Congress opted for an approach aimed at conquering
particular problems in the securities markets that had become glaringly
evident. Although the problems were varied, a thread that connected them
was information—or, more accurately, too little information. One
troublesome circumstance, for example, was that companies seeking to raise
equity capital could—and, therefore, did—promote themselves (and, by
extension, their securities) using exaggerated claims about the companies’
274.

See supra text accompanying note 265.
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prospects.275 Investors, looking for the next new and best thing then as now,
rushed to the opportunity, only to suffer the losses that were certain to
occur.276 Even companies that were more tempered and whose claims did not
stir investors into frenzies were not required to provide the types of
information that would be most useful to investors, such as a description of
the various risks inherent in owning the companies’ securities.277 Accordingly,
even in those circumstances investors may have been too exuberant regarding
the investments, considering the investments’ risks and expected returns.
Perhaps the most formidable problem, however, was fraud in its many
permutations.278 Brokers told their clients about hot new securities, even
those not suitable for the clients, taking in additional commissions with each
sale.279 Investment advisers advised their clients to purchase up-and-coming,
“underpriced” securities, knowing that, when the clients did so, the advisers’
own holdings of the same securities would increase in value.280 Directors and
officers bought stock of their publicly-traded employers before the employers
publicly announced a major success or milestone—and without disclosing the
news to the sellers—thereby realizing the gains on the stock that inevitably
would accrue upon the announcement.281 Investment fund managers caused
the funds they managed to purchase securities from the managers themselves

275. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 48 (1982) (observing that
firms had the discretion to “choose among alternative accounting principles,” which they
sometimes used “to create an exaggerated impression of [their] worth”); Jennifer O’Hare, The
Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud
Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1723 (1998) (“Congress recognized that, prior to the federal
securities laws, sellers routinely made exaggerated statements concerning their securities.”).
276. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 1
(3d ed. 2012) (noting that one of Congress’s goals in enacting the securities laws “was to
discourage speculative frenzies among investors tempted to chase after the next big thing”).
277. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1813–14 (2006) (explaining that, until Congress enacted the Securities
Act, managers were “not compel[led] . . . to disclose information to shareholders, and little
information was indeed disseminated”).
278. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (observing that fraud in the securities markets was
prevalent in the years leading to the Great Depression).
279. This practice is known as “churning.” See Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814,
820 (9th Cir. 1980) (defining “churning” as a broker’s “excessive trading in disregard of his
customer’s investment objectives for the purpose of generating commission business”).
280. See SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 29
(1939) (describing troublesome aspects of the early U.S. investment advisory industry, including
“trading by investment counselors for their own account in securities in which their clients were
interested”).
281. See COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 55
(1934) (observing that corporate officers and directors “used their positions of trust and the
confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market
activities”); Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 56–57 &
n.239 (1980) (describing Congress’s concerns regarding insider trading activity at the time it
formulated the securities laws).

KRUG_PP_TO_AU (DO NOT DELETE)

1612

4/13/2015 3:01 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1559

at prices the managers would not be able to obtain in the open market and
without disclosing that practice to the funds’ investors.282
Congress perceived that the way to address these problems was to ensure
that investors had adequate information—truthful information—both to
enable them to evaluate the risks of any investment and to curb fraudulent
activity.283 Of course, particularly for the latter goal, adequate enforcement
was also critical, as was ongoing oversight of broker–dealers, investment
advisers, and other market professionals.284 But information was the most
essential ingredient, necessary to level the imbalances between those
proposing a transaction or standing to benefit from it, on the one hand, and
investors, on the other. It was only through ensuring that investors were
informed that investors could be protected.
But from what, exactly, did they need protection? Fraud? Get-rich-quick
schemes? Their own excessive exuberance? Glossy brochures? Aggressive sales
pitches? All of the above. They needed protection from speculation.
Speculation in this context is not a problem but a fact. And it has its commonly
known meaning: it is the act of engaging in a transaction in the securities
markets that promises rewards (in the form of investment returns), but that
also carries risks, possibly considerable ones at that.285
Speculation is not bad; indeed, it is inherent in investing. Every
investment that does not serve as a hedge is based on speculation. Real estate
investors buy real estate based on the speculation that the property will
increase in value; investors that buy precious metals, art, or securities have the
same considerations in mind. Indeed, we might go so far as to say that every
contract involves speculation. Parties enter into contracts to receive the
benefit of a promise, typically to be carried out at some point after the
contract is executed.286 Each party speculates that the benefit it will receive in

282. See Edwin P. Rome, Note, Regulation of Investment Companies, 88 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L.
REG. 584, 588 (1940) (noting “self-dealing” as an abusive practice that the SEC sought to address).
283. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 276, at 1 (observing that, in enacting the securities
laws, “Congress’ primary goal was to protect investors who were considering putting capital into
the country’s financial markets . . . by encouraging full disclosure and deterring fraud”).
284. See id. at 37–39 (summarizing the U.S. securities laws and noting the role of the
Exchange Act, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Investment Company Act of 1940 in
regulating market professionals).
285. See, e.g., Speculation, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american_english/speculation (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining “speculation” as
“[i]nvestment in stocks, property, or other ventures in the hope of gain but with the risk of loss”).
This definition—the first result listed in a Google search for “speculation” on March 30, 2015—
arguably is somewhat broader than another commonly-cited definition, which confines
speculation to short- or mid-term investments characterized by the prospect of very large rewards
but also very large possible losses. See Speculation, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/speculation (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (defining speculation as “engagement in
business transactions involving considerable risk but offering the chance of large gains”).
286. See Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and Contract
Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 122 (2013) (asserting that contracts are “promises
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the future is worth its cost. Without speculation, there are no securities
markets—or, indeed, any financial markets. After all, speculation about
something, distilled to its simplest terms, is to have an idea or guess about its
outcome but not to have certainty about it.287 If there is any certainty in
securities investing, it is that there is no certainty.
A byproduct of speculation, however, is misjudgment—investors’
incorrect evaluation of rewards versus risks. That misjudgment is exacerbated
by the intangible nature of securities.288 Because investors cannot kick the
tires, as it were, of the securities they buy, they may be unduly swayed by
dreams of riches, other investors’ enthusiasm, performance that is too good
to be true, and, of course, false or misleading information.289 Speculation in
the securities context, put another way, necessitates that investors rely on
information from outside sources.290 Only if they have access to the right kind
of information and only if that information is truthful can misjudgment be
minimized, creating the greatest possibility that speculation will be successful
and that the securities markets will thrive.
That is the aim of securities regulation. The securities laws and their
emphasis on disclosure seek to dampen unsubstantiated speculation by
requiring that investors be told exactly what they are getting into in placing
their assets at risk.291 With that information, they can make informed
decisions—informed speculative decisions, that is. Accordingly, securities
regulation compels those who may otherwise not be inclined to provide
information to do so, which, in turn, produces the following state of affairs:

backed by coercive force” that people enter into “to ensure that other people will do particular
things at or by a particular time”).
287. See supra note 285 (using such terms as “risk,” “chance,” and “hope” to characterize
speculative activity).
288. See, e.g., Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal
Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 783 (1982) (“In contrast to products that lend
themselves to physical inspection, securities are intangible interests.”).
289. See Samantha Booth, Here Comes the Sun: How Securities Regulations Cast a Shadow on the
Growth of Community Solar in the United States, 61 UCLA L. REV. 760, 779 (2014) (“Because
securities are intangible financial rights . . . they are especially susceptible to fraud, for example
by unscrupulous salespeople who make grand claims and thereby talk unsophisticated purchasers
into buying certificates unsubstantiated by any real economic value.”); Poser, supra note 101, at
1096 (“[S]ecurities are intangible merchandise, the sale of which is peculiarly subject to abuse.”).
290. See Roiter, supra note 288, at 783 (observing that “participants [have] the opportunity
to make informed investment judgments . . . [because of] Congress’s imposition of affirmative
disclosure obligations”).
291. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
763, 874 (1995) (observing that one of the goals of disclosure in securities regulation is achieving
“accurate market valuations”); Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH.
U.L.Q. 403, 403 (2003) (noting that the goal of securities regulation “is quality disclosure to
inform shareholders and would-be shareholders”).
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As to any particular securities investment, the regulatory burden is on one
party to the transaction, but not the other.292
The securities markets and the swap markets may be quite different, but
they have speculation in common. Much like placing assets in a security, the
act of entering into a swap has an unknowable outcome.293 One—an end user,
say—can evaluate the swap’s prospects as best she can, focusing on the
reference asset and its chances of appreciation or default. The end user needs
to evaluate more than that, however. She needs to understand the functioning
of the agreement itself, for that agreement is the financial instrument (and
not the reference asset).294 In that regard, she needs to know the agreement’s
terms, focusing perhaps on its default, liability, collateral payment,
termination, and dispute resolution provisions, among many others.295
Perhaps most important of all, she needs to analyze the financial
soundness of her counterparty—which, in the typical case, is a financial
services firm whose business is to engage in swap and other financial
transactions and whose transactions are often financed through substantial
leverage, or debt.296 The importance of this factor should be apparent:
Regardless of the reference asset for a swap and how it performs over the life
of the swap, any payments to a party under a swap contract based on that
performance come from the other party to the swap. That is simply a product
of how a swap works.297 Because it is nothing more than a contract, any benefit
of the bargain to one party is determined by the terms of the contract itself.
So, for example, if an end user has the long leg of a total return swap that
references LinkedIn—meaning that the end user hopes for appreciation in
LinkedIn’s value—if LinkedIn actually does appreciate, the end user must
look to her counterparty to pay the amount of that appreciation.298 If the
counterparty is insolvent, she has no recourse (beyond her legal remedies as

292. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Delegated Regulatory Administration in Mandatory Disclosure—Some
Observations from EU Securities Regulation, 40 INT’L LAW. 737, 762 (2006) (describing how
“[m]andatory disclosure attempts to redress information asymmetry between investors, issuers, and
the markets” in order to assist investors in attaining “the best possible investment and execution”).
293. See supra Part II.A (describing how swaps are structured and function).
294. See John C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 112 BANKING L.J. 638,
646 n.19 (1995) (noting that swaps are a type of financial instrument).
295. See FIELD FISHER WATERHOUSE, COMMENTARY ON THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT 3 (2008),
available at http://www.fieldfisher.com/media/1979379/Commentary-ISDA-master-agreements.pdf
(describing terms of ISDA Master Agreements, which are form agreements that are “used to
document a wide range of derivative transactions,” including swaps).
296. See Eric D. Roiter, Should Money Market Funds Be Designated as “SIFIs”?, 31 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 749, 756 (2012) (observing that “broker-dealers and [other] finance companies” are
“highly leveraged firms”).
297. See David Harper, Introduction to Counterparty Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.invest
opedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/11/understanding-counterparty-risk.asp (last visited Mar.
18, 2015) (observing that swaps and other derivatives involve payments by one party to the other).
298. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (describing total return swaps).
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a creditor and under the contract).299 Lest this possibility seem unlikely, at
least when the counterparty is a large and established firm, we need only recall
AIG.300 Or Lehman Brothers. Or Bear Stearns. In 2008, counterparty default
was at the heart of systemic contagion and, therefore, the financial crisis
itself.301
At the end of the day, the best an end user can hope for in her evaluation
of a swap is to develop a reasonable understanding of the swap’s rewards and
its risks, particularly its counterparty risk.302 She is speculating, after all.
Accordingly, as in the securities context, if the need to evaluate is great, so is
the need for information. As Subpart A discusses—and also as in the securities
context—the parties to a swap are not equally situated in terms of the
evaluation process. Whereas, in the securities markets, an issuer, insider, or
market intermediary (such as a broker) is typically at an information
advantage, so it is, as well, in the swap markets, where the advantage rests with
those who make a business out of transacting in swaps.303
Or, perhaps a better characterization of the relative situation of the
parties is that the disadvantage rests with end users—and that disadvantage is
due primarily to counterparty risk. In particular, the discussion above notes
three components of a swap transaction requiring evaluation.304 Regarding
the reference asset, the dealer should, in general, have no special insight,
particularly because that asset is usually selected based on the end user’s
hedging needs or profit-generating ideas.305 As for the swap—the contract—
itself, although the dealer typically is the source of the base agreement and,
therefore, its terms, the contract negotiation process helps to balance those

299. See Harper, supra note 297 (describing counterparty risk in the swap context and
concerns arising from it).
300. See supra notes 78–91 (describing AIG’s role in the financial crisis).
301. See Harper, supra note 297 (describing the relationship of counterparty default to
systemic risk).
302. See Buffett Letter, supra note 87, at 13 (“Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized
or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties
to them.”).
303. See Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Chairman’s
Message for the Agency Financial Report (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/Press
Room/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstatement111512 (noting that swap dealers have an
information advantage in the swap markets); Letter from Timothy W. Cameron, Managing Dir.,
Asset Mgmt. Grp., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Assoc., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n 10 (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.sifma.org/comment-letters/2011/
simfa-amg-submits-comments-to-the-cftc-on-business-conduct-standards-for-swap-dealers-and-majorswap-participants,-particularly-special-entities/ (“Swap dealers already have an information
advantage by virtue of entering into both sides of transactions.”).
304. See supra notes 293–301 and accompanying text.
305. This is evident from the definition of swap dealer and, specifically, the prong of that
definition providing that a swap dealer is one who holds itself out as willing to deal in swaps at
the request of other parties. See supra notes 160–63 (discussing the swap dealer definition).
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terms, to the extent they are unduly dealer-friendly.306 Counterparty risk,
however, is more intractable. It is the factor about which swap participants
most need information to make their speculative decision about a swap
transaction.307 Historically, however, that information—or, in lieu of
information, confidence that counterparty risk is not excessive—has been the
most difficult to come by and to evaluate.308
And that is Dodd–Frank’s key regulatory insight in the swap context. An
important swath of Title VII’s substantive requirements applies only to those
firms who fall within the definition of swap dealer. In Title VII’s blueprint,
swap dealers must adhere to capital and margin rules—meaning that they
must maintain a minimum amount of capital and supply a minimum amount
of collateral to the relevant clearinghouse or counterparty in connection with
their swap activities.309 They must also maintain various records regarding
their swap transactions (and allow regulators access to those records),310
adhere to business conduct standards intended to curb fraud and other
abusive practices,311 and ensure adequate oversight of their businesses.312 As
part of their oversight obligations, they must create and implement “robust
and professional” risk management procedures, as well as procedures
reasonably designed to mitigate conflicts of interest among certain firm
personnel.313 Additionally, they must appoint a chief compliance officer
(“CCO”) to oversee the firm’s and its employees’ adherence to those and
other policies and procedures.314 The CCO must report to a senior officer315
and, at least annually, deliver a certified report to the CFTC regarding the
firm’s compliance with Dodd–Frank and the associated agency rules.316
Swap dealers—used here to refer to relevant financial market
professionals rather than everyone who might be encompassed by new
regulatory interpretation of the term—are the party to a swap transaction that
306. Swaps are, after all, privately negotiated instruments. See supra notes 100–12 and
accompanying text (noting that swaps are negotiated agreements).
307. See Rob Roy, Default Swaps Intensify Credit Crunch, MINYANVILLE (Feb. 11, 2008, 11:30 AM),
http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/articles/CS-C-db-MBI-WB-bcs/2/11/2008/id/15
847 (claiming that counterparty risk—the “risk that the other party in an agreement will default”—
is the “greatest risk of all” in the swap markets).
308. See David Rowe, Banks Have Done Too Little, For Too Long on Counterparty Data, RISK MAG.
(Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/opinion/2329630/banks-have-done-toolittle-for-too-long-on-counterparty-data (describing the difficulties associated with firms’
collection and analysis of counterparty risk data).
309. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731, 124 Stat. 1376, 1704–05 (2010)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e) (2012)).
310. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(f), (g)).
311. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)).
312. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)).
313. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)(2), (5))
314. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(k)).
315. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(k)(2)(A)).
316. See id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(k)(3)).
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should bear the regulatory burdens. By the same token, there is less need for
regulation of their non-dealing counterparties, whose solvency can be more
readily evaluated in the same manner that banks evaluate businesses to which
they lend capital.317 Put another way, a regulatory approach founded on
speculation recognizes that, in most transactions, only one party speculates.
Only one party is at a disadvantage in making an informed decision about a
transaction with a presently unknowable outcome. That party is the end user.
Meanwhile, the dealer is at a substantial advantage—indeed, it has control—
as to the factor that is arguably the most important for an end user: Will the
dealer remain solvent, or will its risky trading and dealing activities cause its
downfall?
Swap dealers have an additional advantage over end users, one that goes
beyond discrete swap transactions. In particular, they enjoy a vantage point,
derived from their own dealing activities, from which they may discern more
aggregated activity in the swap markets—trends, notional amounts, types of
swaps, categories of end users, and so on. That vantage point means that swap
dealers may play an important role in furthering Dodd–Frank’s specific
mission of mitigating systemic risk and promoting market integrity, as possible
suppliers of the data that regulators deem critical in understanding the swap
markets and the nature of the risks that they harbor.318 Accordingly, it
constitutes yet another reason for placing the burdens of regulation on swap
dealers, as parties who enable both speculation and regulators’ ability to react
to its excesses. It also constitutes yet another reason why the regulatory logic
that Title VII embodies has nothing to do with pretense, mutual or otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION
The financial crisis demonstrated all too palpably that regulation of swaps
and the swap markets is critical. It did not, however, produce the conclusion
that swaps serve no productive purposes in the financial markets—and,
indeed, the opposite is the case.319 Accordingly, the task of formulating swap
regulation was the task of building safeguards for systemic stability in a way
that did not unduly hinder those productive uses. By-and-large, that task fell

317. See Charles E. Davidson, Environmental Considerations in Loan Documentation, 106 BANKING
L.J. 308, 308 (1989) (observing that lenders’ “standard operating procedure” has encompassed “a
due diligence review based on the industry or business of the borrower, its management, the
borrower’s cash flow, and/or the value of collateral, depending on the nature of the transaction”).
318. This vantage point is also reflected in Title VII, which requires swap dealers periodically
to report to the CFTC extensive information about their swap dealing activities. See Dodd–Frank
Act § 731(f)(1)(A) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (requiring a swap dealer to “make
such reports as are required by the [CFTC] . . . regarding [its] transactions and positions and
financial condition”).
319. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (describing the purposes for which end
users use swaps).
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to the CFTC, and, by-and-large, the agency failed at it, as was most vividly
evident in the market’s reaction.320
The good news, however, is that moving toward a better regulatory
regime based on sounder regulatory principles—principles consonant with
those that underlie securities regulation—is feasible. What is required is a
reorientation of the CFTC’s approach, one that recognizes that the mutual
activity of pretending that inheres in a swap transaction is relevant only as a
descriptor of the transaction and not as a normative basis of regulating it. The
new approach should draw its normative force, instead, from swap
counterparties’ differential advantages and differential risk characteristics.
That is, it ought to train most regulatory obligations on the party that has the
most information and that presents the greatest risks—the party, in other
words, that deals in swaps, with “deal” having that meaning that it has
traditionally had in the securities context rather than as the CFTC would have
us understand the term.321 This means that the CFTC needs to return to the
drawing board. Of course, the agency’s heeding this Article’s call and doing
so will result in further delay to the regulation of swaps that has been necessary
for so long. However, the goal of ensuring well-functioning financial markets
would have it no other way.

320. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (describing some swap participants’
reactions to the swap rules).
321. See supra Part III.A (describing the CFTC’s unduly broad interpretation of “swap
dealer”).

